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NOTES
A JURY OF ONE'S PEERS: VIRGINIA'S RESTORATION OF
RIGHTS PROCESS AND ITS DISPROPORTIONATE EFFECT
ON THE AFRICAN AMERICAN COMMUNITY
INTRODUCTION
The plaintiff, an African American male, brought an action
against the defendant, a white male, for alleged injuries sustained
when the defendant's car collided with the plaintiffs car. During
voir dire, the judge asked the prospective jurors if any of them had
been convicted of a felony. The only African American member in
the jury pool looked inquisitive as he slowly raised his hand, and he
explained to the judge that he had been convicted of a felony ten
years ago. With a sympathetic look on his face, the judge dismissed
the prospective juror and explained that under Virginia law all
convicted felons are excluded from serving on any jury unless their
civil rights have been restored by the state.'
Under current Virginia law, convicted felons permanently lose
their civil rights unless they apply for, and are granted, a restora-
tion of those rights by the State.2 These rights include, among
others, the right to vote,3 the right to hold public office,4 and the
1. This fictionalized story is based on actual courtroom events that occurred in
Virginia's Ninth Circuit Court located in Williamsburg, Virginia, on September 10, 2003.
2. VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-23.1 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004) (requiring the Director of the
Department of Corrections to notify convicted felons of their loss of civil rights as well as the
process required to restore those rights).
3. VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-427 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004) (noting that those convicted of
a felony are disqualified to vote).
4. VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-231 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004) (noting that those convicted of
a felony are disqualified from holding public office or serving as a political appointee).
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right to serve on a jury.' The Governor has the sole authority to
restore a felon's civil rights.6 In the summer of 2002, Governor
Warner instituted an expedited review process for those convicted
of non-violent felonies applying for a restoration of their civil
rights.7 Although the new process has enabled more convicted felons
to regain their civil rights,8 the blanket denial of civil rights to
convicted felons who have finished serving their sentence has a
significant impact on jury trials, particularly those involving
African Americans.
One in four African American males in Virginia is a convicted
felon,' without the right to serve on a jury. This demonstrates that
the exclusion of felons from service on both civil and criminal
juries prevents a significant number of African American males
in Virginia from representing a fair cross-section of their commu-
nity in the jury pool.' ° As a result, Virginia's restoration of rights
process, although neutral on its face, disparately impacts the
5. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-338 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004) (describing the persons who are
disqualified from serving as jurors, including persons who have been convicted of a felony).
6. VA. CONST. art. V, § 12 (stating that the power to grant pardons and remove political
disabilities resides solely within the authority of the Governor); see also In re Phillips, 574
S.E.2d 270, 273 (Va. 2003) (noting that the power to restore a felon's rights resides in the
Governor and this power is separate and distinct from the other branches of government).
7. Sec'y of the Commonwealth, Application for Restoration of Rights for Certain Non-
violent Offenders, available at httpJ//www.commonwealth.virginia.gov/Clemency/RORShort
App.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2005) [hereinafter Application for Restoration ofRights]; see also
Laurence Hammack, Governor Helps Felons Regain Civil Rights, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD
NEWS (Virginia), May 10, 2004, at 31.
8. See Hammack, supra note 7, at B1 (noting that under the new restoration of rights
process that distinguishes between non-violent and violent felonies, Governor Warner has
restored the rights to more convicted felons than the previous three governors combined).
9. Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Restore Your Right to Vote in
Virginia, available at http://www.lawyerscomm.org/ep04/50states/virginia.pdf (last visited
Feb. 2, 2005) (noting that twenty-five percent of black men in Virginia are disenfranchised)
[hereinafter Restore Your Right to Vote]; see also Felons File Lawsuit to Challenge Vote Law,
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Oct. 31, 2002 at B2. Five African American males convicted of
a felony have challenged the Virginia law that excludes them from voting, arguing that the
law is unconstitutional because it disproportionately deprives African Americans of their
voting rights. Id.
10. See Robert Joe Lee, Minority Issues in Jury Management, for the Committee on
Minority Access to Justice, Supreme Court Task Force on Minority Concerns 9 (Sept. 1991)
(finding that "[tihe combined effects of certain qualifications ... are that up to about one-half
of each minority group is excluded from jury service" and that if the jury pool does not
contain an "acceptable range of the proportion of minorities in the general population, there
may be de facto discrimination").
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African American community and may deprive an accused African
American of his right to be tried by a jury of his peers in a criminal
trial.
This Note will explore the restoration of civil rights process and
its effect on the jury system in Virginia, particularly on the African
American community. Part I discusses the creation of the Anglo-
American jury and the development of the jury system in America,
and it also discusses the important Supreme Court rulings that
shape jury composition and the ways in which the State is permit-
ted to exclude prospective jury members. Following the history of
the American jury, Part II explains the Supreme Court's fair cross-
section requirement for jury representation. Part III analyzes
Virginia's restoration of civil rights process by describing the policy
as it currently exists and comparing it with proposed legislation,
which would have eased the restoration of voting rights process
for those convicted of non-violent felonies. Part IV provides a
national overview of felony exclusion laws that prohibit felons from
serving as jurors, using Virginia as a benchmark. This Part also
offers policy arguments against these laws. Part V outlines the
arguments for and against Virginia's current policy in the context
of both criminal and civil cases. In addition, this Part analyzes the
treatment of drug offenders and evaluates specifically how it
burdens the African American community. Part VI highlights the
constitutional concerns that underlie Virginia's restoration of civil
rights process and its effect on the jury system. Specifically, this
Part addresses three constitutional issues: the Sixth Amendment's
jury of one's peers requirement, the Fourteenth Amendment's due
process requirement that laws be racially neutral, and the right to
privacy found in the Ninth Amendment, in the context of the
requirement that a felon disclose his felony status before being
eligible to serve on a jury. In conclusion, this Note proposes that
legislation should be enacted that would make all felons eligible to
apply for a restoration of their civil rights immediately upon
completion of their sentence, using the expedited process for non-
violent felons set forth in the current restoration of rights policy.
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I. HISTORY OF THE JURY SYSTEM
The Anglo-American jury system has its roots in the Magna
Carta, which was signed by the King of England in 1215.1" Prior to
the implementation of the Magna Carta, the King served as the
head of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of govern-
ment.12 Mounting dissension to the King's tyrannical oppression led
the barons of England to draft the Magna Carta, which prohibited
the King from punishing anyone unless the individual had been
judged by a jury of his peers.'" Firmly rooted in this English
tradition, the right to a trial by jury was adhered to in America
after settlement of the colonies.' 4 Indeed, in 1606, the Governor of
Virginia declared by royal decree that all criminal defendants in the
colony would be tried by jury.'5
A. The American Colonies and the Jury System
According to historian J.R. Pole, the early Anglo-American jury
served as a practical and economically efficient tool of the govern-
ment in judicial proceedings.' 6 Juries provided a way for members
of the community to come together to set community standards, to
create a standard of morality, and to instill loyalty to one's commu-
nity. ' In colonial America, juries often acted as a form of resistance
against the King. Jurors held democratic power over the law
imposed upon them, because the King could not decide whether the
11. See LYSANDER SPOONER, AN ESSAYON THE TRIAL BYJURY 1 (The Lawbook Exchange,
Ltd. 2002) (expounding upon the long-standing right ofjuries to judge the accused).
12. Id. at 20 (noting that judges were servants of the King).
13. See id. at 21-22 (explaining that the Magna Carta required the "consent of the peers"
of the accused before the King could pronounce a punishment).
14. See LEONARD W. LEVY, THE PALLADIUM OF JUSTICE: ORIGINS OF TRIAL BY JURY 66
(1999) (commenting that the charters of Virginia and other colonies afforded colonists the
same rights as Englishmen).
15. Id.
16. J.R. Pole, "A Quest of Thoughts": Representation and Moral Agency in the Early
Anglo-American Jury, in "THE DEAREST BIRTH RIGHT OFTHE PEOPLE OFENGLAND": THE JURY
IN THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw 101, 102 (John W. Cairns & Grant McLeod eds., 2002)
(noting that juries "nourished loyalty" of community members).
17. See id. (explaining the power ofjuries to mitigate or enhance the law).
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jury would originate prosecutions, where the trial would be, or who
would serve as the jury.18 The First Continental Congress declared
in 1774 that the colonies and their inhabitants were "entitled ... to
the great and inestimable privilege of being tried by their peers." 9
A few years later, the Declaration of Independence condemned
the King's control over the colonies' judicial system through his
appointment of judges and his denial of "the benefit of trial by
jury. "20
B. Establishing the American Jury System
In establishing the American judicial system, the newly formed
nation grappled with issues of impartiality and locality with respect
to juries when formulating the Constitution and deciding rules of
criminal procedure. 21 Specifically, Anti-Federalists argued that a
local jury would be more familiar with the location in which a crime
occurred and also would know the general character of the
accused.22 A local jury with personal knowledge, therefore, would be
able to serve as a better judge than a jury foreign to the location
and to the criminal defendant. 23 Federalists, however, argued that
local representation in making laws would be satisfied in the
formation of Congress and state legislatures. 24 A local jury would
not be needed to interpret the law based on community norms, as
was necessary when the colonists were under British control and
18. See JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF
DEMOCRACY 25 (1994) (describing juries, "in moments of crisis," as having "the last say on
what the law was in their community"); see also RITA J. SIMON, THE JURY: ITS ROLE IN
AMERICAN SOCIETY 5-6 (1980) (noting thatjuries served as a "symbol of rebellion" against the
King).
19. SIMON, supra note 18, at 5 (describing the colonists' recognition of a trial by jury to
be a fundamental right).
20. Id. at 6.
21. See ABRAMSON, supra note 18, at 22-33 (highlighting the fundamental arguments
debated between the Anti-Federalists, who preferred local juries to ensure impartiality, and
the Federalists, who argued local juries would be biased due to the likelihood of the jurors
knowing the parties at trial or knowing the issues on trial).
22. Id. at 27 (focusing on jurors as fact finders).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 33 (arguing that locally elected legislatures would create laws fair and
reflective of the community).
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the jury served as the colonists' only form of representative
government.25
The Federalists and Anti-Federalists compromised on the issue
of locality in creating what is now the Sixth Amendment.26 The
Amendment requires criminal defendants to be tried by a jury
located in "the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed."" Federalists, who initially opposed the idea of a local
jury, retained the language in the Sixth Amendment requiring the
accused to be tried in districts created by the federal Judiciary
Act.2" However, Anti-Federalists achieved a victory for local juries,
as jury members had to be chosen from the districts where the
crime occurred, and Congress could not expand the districts to a
size larger than a state.29 Being tried by a jury composed of local
citizens, therefore, eventually became accepted as the defendant's
best hope for an impartial trial.
C. Issues with Jury Representation for African Americans and
Women
In addition to the issues of locality and impartiality, the nation
wrestled with the question of jury representation and who consti-
tuted "one's peers." Historically, women and African Americans
were excluded from jury service.3" Following the Civil War, African
American men became eligible for jury service based on the passage
of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, but
southern states continued to deny them their right to serve on a
25. Id. (noting the difference between an elected legislature and a King).
26. Id. at 35-36 (compromising on local juries by allowing Congress to select the
geographic boundary from which ajuror would be selected, but limiting the boundary to each
individual state in existence at that time).
27. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
28. See ABRAMSON, supra note 18, at 35 (noting the true victory of the Anti-Federalists,
as the Constitution limited Congress's authority to create districts larger than a state).
29. Id. at 36. The Judiciary Act highlighted the importance of local juries as it required
juries to be selected from the county where the crime was committed, if the crime carried a
possible punishment of death. Id.
30. For a discussion on all-white juries prior to the Supreme Court's requirement that
a fair cross-section of the community be pooled for jury service, see ABRAMSON, supra note
18, at 105-07. For a discussion on the exclusion of women from juries, see id. at 112-15.
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jury until the middle of the twentieth century.3' Most women did
not receive the right to serve on a jury until the early twentieth
century.32
D. The Supreme Court and Jury Representation
By the end of Reconstruction, with the drafting of the Fourteenth
Amendment requiring "equal protection of the laws,"3 courts had
to decide how the Amendment would affect notions of fairness and
representation for newly freed African Americans on trial, who had
to be tried by a jury of their "peers."34 One possibility was for courts
to require that, in criminal trials, at least some jurors must be the
same race as the defendant. For instance, prior to the United States
receiving its independence, a colonial Massachusetts court decided
that a jury of one's peers for a Native American accused of a crime
should include Native Americans;35 consequently, the court allowed
a jury composed of six Native Americans and six Englishmen to try
the Native American defendant.36 Another possibility was for the
courts to construe the "jury of one's peers" requirement to mean
only that criminal defendants are entitled to request a trial by jury
rather than having a bench trial. Not until its decision in Strauder
v. West Virginia3' did the Supreme Court finally address the issue
31. SIMON, supra note 18, at 7 (noting that juries in the South consistently decided
against African Americans, whether they were the accused or the victim of crime).
32. ABRAMSON, supra note 18, at 113. The first state to allow women to serve on juries
was Utah, in 1898. Id. After the Nineteenth Amendment was passed in 1920, many states
allowed women to serve as jurors; however, a majority of states did not qualify women to
serve until 1940. Id.
33. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (requiring states to apply the laws equally to all
citizens).
34. See Pole, supra note 16, at 110 (commenting on the racial element of defining "peers"
during Reconstruction).
35. See id. (noting that aliens and other societal groups that lacked political
representation had a need for representation in the jury).
36. Id. In a perhaps odd sense of justice, Native Americans were treated as aliens
without representation in government. Although the Native Americans could be held to laws
that they were not permitted to participate in creating, juries could include Native
Americans to "represent" Native Americans on trial. Id.
37. 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (holding that a state statute that facially discriminated against
African Americans to be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
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of what constitutes a representative jury with respect to African
Americans.
In Strauder, the Court held that a jury of one's peers is a jury
where the members hold the same legal status within the commu-
nity as that of the accused.3" The defendant in Strauder, an African
American male, appealed his murder conviction, objecting to the
circuit court's denial of removal to federal court where African
Americans would be eligible for jury service."s West Virginia law
denied African Americans the ability to serve on a jury, which the
defendant claimed would deny him equal protection of the law as
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.4 ° The Court stated that
the West Virginia law singled out African Americans, branding
them as inferior.4' Expounding upon the basic premise of ajury, the
Court concluded that a jury is composed of individuals with the
same rights as the accused; thus, by denying African Americans the
ability to serve on a jury in the defendant's trial, the defendant did
not receive a trial by a jury comprised of his peers.42 Consequently,
the state had denied the defendant equal protection under the
law.
43
In Strauder, the Supreme Court determined that the state could
not systematically deny African Americans the right to serve on a
jury,44 but it limited the application of Strauder in its decision in
38. Id. at 308 ("The very idea of a jury is a body of men composed of the peers or equals
of the person whose rights it is selected or summoned to determine.").
39. Id. at 304. A former slave, the defendant believed he would not receive the "full and
equal" protection of the law if tried in a state court. Id.
40. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1; see also Strauder, 100 U.S. at 304. After the state court
denied the defendant's petition for removal to a federal court, the defendant made several
motions to quash the venire, all of which the state court denied. Id.
41. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308. Specifically, the Court stated:
The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly denied by a
statute all right to participate ... as jurors ... is practically a brand upon them[,]
... an assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which
is an impediment to securing to individuals of the race that equal justice which
the law aims to secure to all others.
Id.
42. See id.
43. Id. at 308-10 (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit states from
qualifying jurors on non-racial grounds).
44. See id. at 309 (determining that states cannot qualify jurors on the basis of race).
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Virginia v. Rives.45 In Rives, the Court analyzed Virginia's jury
system and its exclusion of African Americans from serving as
jurors under the Fourteenth Amendment.46 In Rives, the defen-
dants, African American males, petitioned to have their all-white
jury modified so that one-third of the jury would be composed of
African Americans. 7 The state court denied the defendants' request
and later denied the defendants' petition for a change of venue to
federal court.4 At the time of the trial, the Commonwealth of
Virginia allowed "all male citizens twenty-one years of age and not
over sixty, who are entitled to vote and hold office under the
Constitution" to serve as jurors.4" Because Virginia did not specifi-
cally prohibit African Americans from serving as jurors, the Court
found that Virginia did not explicitly exclude them from serving as
jury members, despite the fact that no African Americans had
served on the defendants' jury.5 ° Therefore, the Court held that the
defendants did not prove that the Commonwealth had denied them
equal protection of the laws.5' Even though the defendants'jury had
no African American members and the county in which the trial
took place had never allowed an African American to serve as ajury
member when an African American stood as the accused, the Court
found that the defendants "fleill short of showing that any civil
right was denied, or that there had been any discrimination against
the defendants because of their color or race."52
45. 100 U.S. 313 (1879) (holding that if a state law requires racial impartiality for jury
selection, the fact that no member of an accused's race serves on the jury does not create a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 314-15.
48. Id. at 315-16 (describing the state court's refusal to empanel a new jury or remove
the case to a federal court).
49. Id. at 320. Although the statute did not explicitly deny African Americans the right
to serve on a jury, the statute's juror qualifications likely would have the effect of eliminating
African American jurors. Many southern states required literacy tests or poll taxes as a
condition to vote in an attempt to prohibit African Americans from voting, and consequently,
from serving on juries.
50. Id. at 320-21. The Court notes that if the defendants could show that a state official
limited juror selection to whites, this would be a violation of the Virginia statute and the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
51. Id. at 322 (noting that the defendants had a right to an impartially selected jury, not
the right to a jury composed of members of their own race).
52. Id. (finding that the jury "may have been impartially selected").
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The defendant in Strauder experienced de jure discrimination,
as West Virginia specifically denied African Americans the ability
to serve on a jury. 53 The defendants in Rives, however, experienced
de facto discrimination with respect to jury composition, because
the Commonwealth had not specifically denied members of the
defendants' race from serving on juries, even though no jury
member from the defendants' race served on the defendants' jury.54
At the turn of the twentieth century, therefore, the Supreme Court
decided that when states specifically bar African Americans from
serving as jury members, the states denied African Americans
equal protection under the laws. However, the Court allowed states
to discriminate in selecting juries by de facto means, such that
states could discriminate as to who could serve on a jury in a
manner that would adversely affect African Americans, without
violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
II. THE FAIR CROSS-SECTION REQUIREMENT
Almost one hundred years following the decisions in Strauder55
and Rives, 6 the Supreme Court reconsidered the issue of jury
representation. In Taylor v. Louisiana,57 the Court held that jury
pools must be "reasonably representative" of the accused's commu-
nity in order to protect the accused's Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights.5" Elaborating on those rights, the Court declared that
a jury must be "drawn from a fair cross section of the community."59
53. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 304 (1879).
54. See Rives, 100 U.S. at 320-21.
55. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 303.
56. Rives, 100 U.S. at 313.
57. 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (holding the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to be tried by
ajury of his peers was violated due to a state statute that excluded women from the jury pool
unless women volunteered to serve as jurors).
58. Id. at 538 (noting that juries do not have to be representative of a fair cross-section
of the community, but must be selected from such).
59. Id. at 527 (holding the fair cross-section requirement necessary to the concept of trial
by jury).
2118 [Vol. 46:2109
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The Court created further substance to its finding in Taylor a few
years later in Duren v. Missouri.0
A. Underrepresented Juries and Statistics
In Duren, the defendant appealed his conviction, claiming that he
did not have a jury composed of a fair cross-section of the commu-
nity.6' In 1979, Missouri was one of two states that excluded women
from jury service if they requested not to serve.62 At the time of the
trial, women made up fifty-four percent of the adult population in
the defendant's county, but less than fifteen percent of the female
population had been summoned to appear for voir dire.63
In its opinion, the Court laid out a three-prong test that a
defendant must satisfy to establish a prima facie violation of the
fair cross-section requirement:
(1) [T]hat the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinctive' group
in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in
venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable
in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and
(3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion
of the group in the jury-selection process.'
60. 439 U.S. 357 (1979) (holding the state's automatic exemption of women who did not
want to serve on ajury a violation of the defendant's right to ajury selected from a fair cross-
section of the community).
61. Id. at 360. Interestingly, the defendant did not claim that someone of his own race
or gender was excluded from the jury pool. Rather, the defendant claimed that by excluding
women from the jury pool, the state denied him of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights.
62. Id. at 359-60 (noting that Tennessee also excluded from jury service women who
requested not to serve).
63. Id. at 362. The defendant submitted statistical reports on the percentage of females
serving as jury members during the ten months prior to his trial. The defendant calculated
the percentage by using population census data collected six years prior to his trial. See id.
at 362-63. The Missouri Supreme Court contended that due to the age of the census data, the
statistical reports may not have accurately reflected the percentage of women eligible to
serve as jury members at the time of the defendant's trial. Id. at 363. However, the court
concluded that even if the statistics were accurate, the Missouri system still met
constitutional requirements. Id.
64. Id. at 364.
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The Court found that the defendant had met this burden, relying
largely upon statistical data.65 First, the Court noted that they
previously had acknowledged, in Taylor, that women were a distinct
group in the community.6 Second, the defendant demonstrated
through census reports the percentage of women within the
community.6 As the defendant showed that women composed over
half of the county's population, the Court concluded that women
were not represented in a reasonable manner, because only
approximately fifteen percent of women had been summoned and
appeared for voir dire.68 Finally, the Court found that the large
discrepancy between the female population of the county and the
composition of juries, which had been consistent for at least ten
months prior to the defendant's trial, showed that "the cause of the
underrepresentation was systematic-that is, inherent in the
particular jury-selection process utilized."69
As the defendant had met his burden of showing a prima facie
case of a violation of the fair cross-section requirement, the burden
shifted to the State of Missouri to show that meeting the fair cross-
section requirement would impinge upon a "significant state
interest." ° Because the state could not prove that any permissible
jury exemptions caused the underrepresentation, the automatic
exemption for women appeared to be the only viable cause.7' The
state claimed that most women served as caretakers for their
children and that the state had an interest in protecting the role
65. Id. at 364-70. The defendant satisfied the last two prongs of the three-prong test to
prove a prima facie violation of the cross-section requirement using statistical data.
66. Id. (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 531 (1975)).
67. Id. (finding the "percentage of the community" the alleged underrepresented group
comprises to be the "conceptual benchmark for the Sixth Amendment fair cross-section
requirement").
68. Id. at 365-66 (commenting that if the percentage of women in the community was
accurately mirrored in the composition ofjury pools, more than one out of every two jurors
should be women, but that in actuality only one out of every six jurors were women).
69. Id. at 366 (finding that "85% of the average jury was male").
70. Id. at 368. The state argued that more women than men possibly could qualify for
permissible exemptions from jury service. Id. Possible exemptions included being over the
age of sixty-five or working as a teacher or government worker. Id. The state, however, could
not prove that these permissible exemptions from jury service caused the discrepancy
between the number of women in the population and those actually serving on juries. Id. at
368-69.
71. Id. at 368-69 (noting that the state must offer proof that the permissive exemptions
caused the underrepresentation of women on juries).
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of women in the home.72 The Court, however, found that the
automatic exemption of women was overinclusive, as not all women
had "domestic responsibilities."73 The overinclusive nature of the
automatic exemption of women, therefore, did not meet constitu-
tional muster, as it violated the fair cross-section requirement.74
B. Constitutional Standards and Jury Representation
The Supreme Court has articulated important constitutional
standards with respect to juries and representation since the end
of the Civil War. First, the Court has held that de jure discrimina-
tion in jury composition is unconstitutional." In Strauder, the
Court stated that a criminal defendant has the right to a jury
composed of his peers, defining peers as those members of the
community that hold the same legal status as the accused."6 When
the State deliberately denies the right to serve as a jury member to
a particular segment of the community with the same legal status
as the accused, the State violates the defendant's Fourteenth
Amendment right to equal protection of the laws." Second, the
Court is willing to allow de facto discrimination with respect to jury
composition.78 In Rives, even though no member of the defendant's
race served as a member of his jury, the Court held that the
defendant's Fourteenth Amendment rights were not violated.79
Because the Commonwealth had not purposefully denied African
Americans the ability to serve on a jury, the lack of African
72. Id. at 369 ("[Tlhe only state interest advanced by the exemption is safeguarding the
important role played by women in home and family life.").
73. Id (excluding all women because of the domestic responsibilities of a few did not
justify the gross underrepresentation of women within the jury pool).
74. Id. at 370. But see id. at 374-75 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court
"is simply playing a constitutional numbers game" and that there is no essential difference
between a jury in which fifteen percent of the members are women and a jury in which
twenty or thirty percent of the members are women).
75. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879) (holding that states may not
explicitly exclude African Americans from serving as jurors).
76. Id. at 308 (finding that a jury must be composed of the accused's peers).
77. See id. at 309-10 (concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment protects against
discrimination based on race).
78. See Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1879).
79. Id. (finding that the jury was composed pursuant to a neutral law).
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American jurors did not indicate a violation of the defendant's
rights .80
Finally, the Court has held that juries must be selected from a
fair cross-section of the community,8' and that if a specific portion
of the community is underrepresented in jury composition, the
defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights may be
violated. 2 In Duren, the defendant showed that the state automati-
cally exempted women from jury service upon request, resulting in
a dramatic underrepresentation of women serving on juries." The
defendant proved the case of underrepresentation through the use
of statistics, which the Court accepted as a legitimate way to prove
the lack of a fair cross-section of the community. 4 As the state
offered no legitimate interest in systematically excluding women
from jury service, the Court held the automatic exemption unconsti-
tutional.85 These principles enunciated by the Supreme Court
regarding de facto and de jure discrimination in jury selection and
regarding the fair cross-section requirement may indicate that
Virginia's current restoration of civil rights process may not meet
constitutional muster, because it disparately impacts African
American males and systematically denies those convicted of
felonies from being eligible for jury selection.
III. VIRGINIA'S CURRENT RESTORATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS PROCESS
AND ITS EFFECT ON JURY SELECTION
Virginia's restoration of civil rights process is part of the Common-
wealth's felony disenfranchisement laws, which deny civil rights to
citizens convicted of felonies. 6 Felony disenfranchisement laws
80. Id.; see also Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316, 320-21 (1906) (holding that a defendant
has a right to be tried by a jury that is selected according to nondiscriminatory standards,
but that a defendant does not have a right to be tried by a jury partially or wholly composed
ofjurors from his same race).
81. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1975).
82. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 358-59 (1979) (citing Taylor, 419 U.S. at 526-31,
538).
83. Id. at 366.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 368-70.
86. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 53.1-231.1 to 231.2 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004) (describing the
process by which felons are notified of their loss of civil rights and the process by which
felons may apply for the right to vote).
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made their way into colonial America through the British practice
of adding civil punishments to the criminal sanctions imposed on
those convicted of felonies.87 The additional civil punishment of
being denied the right to participate in the political process
extended from the belief that those convicted of felonies were less
trustworthy and more capable of fraud. 8 Disenfranchisement laws
"increased in importance and effect" in America following the Civil
War." At the start of the twenty-first century, all but two states
disenfranchised felons in some form or another, with twelve states
permanently disenfranchising "at least some ex-felons." s°
In 1998, the Human Rights Watch's Sentencing Project released
its report on felon disenfranchisement laws in the United States.9 '
The report highlighted the disproportionate racial impact created
by state disenfranchisement laws, listing Virginia as one of five
states with laws that permanently disenfranchise one out of every
four African American men.9 2 After Virginia's disenfranchisement
laws and their racial impact received national attention, the
Virginia Black Caucus, led by chairman Delegate Jerrauld Jones,
pushed for new legislation "to ease the process felons must go
through to regain their voting rights."93 Although killed in commit-
tee when first introduced, 4 the General Assembly enacted new
legislation in 2000 to amend the restoration of civil rights process
87. Martine J. Price, Note and Comment, Addressing Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement:
Legislation vs. Litigation, 11 J.L. & POLY 369, 370 (2002) (noting that the English practice
of "imposing collateral civil consequences to felony convictions" was continued in America).
88. Id. at 370-71 (justifying the disenfranchisement laws as a way to decrease fraud by
keeping felons away from the political process).
89. Id. at 369 (highlighting that this practice continues today with the same level of
enthusiasm).
90. See id. at 371-74 (commenting that twelve states allow for the permanent
disenfranchisement of"at least some ex-felons, even after sentence and parole completion").
91. Human Rights Watch & The Sentencing Project, Losing the Vote: The Impact of
Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States (1998), available at http://www.hrw.
org/reports98/vote/index.html (providing a state-by-state breakdown of felony
disenfranchisement laws) [hereinafter Losing the Vote].
92. Id. at pt. III. In addition to Virginia, one out of every four African American men is
permanently disenfranchised due to a felony conviction in Iowa, Mississippi, New Mexico and
Wyoming. See Losing the Vote, supra note 91.
93. Ruth S. Intress, Snubs Alleged by Black Caucus; Gilmore: Minority Issues Not
Ignored, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 3, 2000, at Al (discussing the Legislative Black
Caucus's failed effort to pass legislation that would ease the process felons must endure to
regain voting rights).
94. Id.
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felons must go through to regain their voting rights. However, the
new legislation does not apply to the restoration of other rights,
including the right to serve on a jury.95 Two years after the legis-
lation to restore voting rights passed, Governor Warner issued a
new policy that expedited the restoration of rights process for all
non-violent felons.96
A. The Current Restoration of Rights Process
Under Virginia's new restoration of rights process promulgated
by Governor Warner in 2002, those citizens convicted of non-violent
felonies are subject to an expedited review after applying for a
restoration of their rights.97 Those "convicted of violent felonies, a
drug manufacturing or distribution offense or an election law
offense" are required to apply under the traditional restoration of
rights process.9" Under the expedited review process for non-violent
felons, an applicant will be notified of the Governor's decision to
grant or deny the restoration of rights request within six months.99
There is no time frame for when the Governor will act on an
application to restore civil rights for those convicted of violent
felonies, a drug-related offense, or election fraud.
Although non-violent felons are assured the Governor will take
action on their restoration of rights application within six months
of filing a completed application, the applicants are still required to
wait three years upon finishing their sentence (including parole)
95. VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-231.2 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004); see Bob Gibson, Group
Helping Ex-Felons Regain Their Voting Rights, RIcHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Nov. 28, 2000,
at B2 (noting that due to the difficulty of the voting rights process, even after the passage of
the new law, some officials and convicted felons who have had their voting rights restored
started the Voting Rights Committee to offer free assistance to those convicted felons trying
to regain their voting rights).
96. Application for Restoration of Rights, supra note 7 (providing non-violent felons a
shortened process" to apply to have their civil rights restored by the Governor).
97. Id.
98. Id. (noting that felons not eligible for the shortened process should contact the
Secretary of the Commonwealth to receive information on the correct process).
99. Sec'y of the Commonwealth, Restoration of Rights Letter (2002), available at
http://www.commonwealth.virginia.gov/Clemency/rorLetter2002.doc (describing the basic
requirements for non-violent felons wishing to have their civil rights restored).
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before they can become eligible. 00 During the three year period, the
applicant must be free from both subsequent felony and misde-
meanor convictions.'0 The decision of the Governor to deny a
petition is final and may not be appealed. 1 2 However, a non-violent
felon may re-apply two years after a denial. 1 3
The application for non-violent felons is a one-page form,
designed to be easier for applicants to complete than the lengthy
application required for those convicted of violent felonies.' 4 The
form is issued by the Secretary of the Commonwealth' 5 and the
Director of the Department of Corrections is required to notify a
convicted felon of the restoration of rights application process.' 6
The form asks for basic identification information as well as for
information about the felonies and any misdemeanors of which the
applicant has been convicted. 1°' Specifically, the applicant must
identify each felony and misdemeanor conviction along with the
name of the court where the conviction occurred and the date of the
conviction.'0 8
100. Application for Restoration of Rights, supra note 7 (including, in addition to parole,
any suspended sentence or probation).
101. Id. (requiring all court costs or fines to be paid as well).
102. Id. (noting a restoration of rights is at the Governor's discretion).
103. Id. (permitting an applicant to re-apply although initial denial is a result of the
applicant providing false information).
104. Id. Only half of the one page form requires the applicant to supply information; the
remaining half of the form is an affidavit which the applicant must sign in the presence of
a public notary.
105. See Sec'y of the Commonwealth, Clemency (2005), available at http://www.
commonwealth.virginia.gov/Clemency/clemency.cfm [hereinafter Clemency).
106. VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-231.1 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004) (requiring the Director of the
Department of Corrections to notify a convicted felon regarding the loss of his civil rights as
well as the process required of the felon in order to regain those rights upon completion of
the felon's sentence).
107. See Clemency, supra note 105 (requesting identification information such as name
when convicted, both home and mailing addresses, both work and home phone numbers, date
of birth, and social security number).
108. See id. (requiring the applicant to attach additional pages if necessary as the form
only provides space for listing one felony).
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The restoration of rights process for those convicted of violent
felonies, drug-related offenses,' °9 or election fraud,'O is more
complicated. Unlike those convicted of non-violent felonies, there is
no expedited review process and the application is more lengthy and
cumbersome. Additionally, while the application's instructions state
that the applicant does not need the services of an attorney to
petition the Governor, the application is over three times the length
of the non-violent application."'
Specifically, the application requires the submission of several
documents along with the completion of a two-page form." 2 The
requested documents include: certified copies of the applicant's
felony court orders and sentencing orders, certified copies noting
fines and court cost payment, a letter of petition, a letter from the
applicant's probation officer or parole officer defining the applicant's
supervision period, a copy of the applicant's pre- and post- sentenc-
ing report, three reference letters from reputable community
members who can attest to the applicant's good character, and a
personal letter in which the applicant can demonstrate how his life
has changed and why he believes his civil rights should be
restored."' The application also asks for identification information,
including the applicant's former prison number and the name
under which the state convicted the applicant."4 The applicant
must have completed any probation period, or finished with a
suspended sentence, five years before applying to have his civil
109. Those convicted of drug-related offenses as defined in VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-248,
-248.01, -248.1, -255, -255.2, -258.02 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004) are not eligible for an
expedited review.
110. Those convicted of election fraud as defined in VA. CODEANN. § 24.2-1016 (West 2001
& Supp. 2004) are not eligible for an expedited review.
111. Sec'y of the Commonwealth, Application and Instructions for Restoration of Civil
Rights, available at httpJ/www.commonwealth.virginia.gov/Clemency/restore.pdf(last visited
Feb. 2, 2005) [hereinafter Application and Instructions]. The application includes seven pages
of instructions and supplemental information. Id. In contrast, the shortened application
process for non-violent felons includes a half page of instructions and supplemental
information. See Application for Restoration, supra note 7.
112. Application and Instructions, supra note 111 (requiring the applicant to address
nineteen requests and to have the form notorized).
113. Id. The personal letter should also list community activities in which the applicant
is involved.
114. Id. (including convictions in other states).
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rights restored. 1 5 Once the application is complete, the applicant is
to return it to the Secretary of the Commonwealth. 1 6
As with non-violent felons, those convicted of a violent felony,
a drug-related offense, or election fraud are to be notified by the
state of the loss of their civil rights and the process through which
they may regain those rights."' However, unlike with non-violent
offenders, there is no guarantee that the Governor will review other
applicants' petitions in a timely manner."18 Since the Governor has
the sole authority to grant a restoration of rights, and there is no
law mandating the Governor to act upon an application within a
specified period of time, those felons not eligible for the shortened
restoration of rights process may never regain their civil rights,
including the right to serve on a jury, even though they have met
the application requirements." 9
B. Regaining the Right to Vote
Like Governor Warner's distinction between non-violent felons
and those felons convicted of violent crimes, drug-related crimes, or
election fraud crimes, the General Assembly promulgated new
legislation in 2000 expediting the process to regain the right to vote,
distinguishing between the same categories of felons. 2 ' Non-violent
felons, only wishing to regain their right to vote, can petition the
115. Id. In comparison, non-violent felons must be free from probation, parole, or a
suspended sentence, for three years. See Application for Restoration of Rights, supra note 7.
116. Application and Instructions, supra note 111.
117. VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-231.1 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004). The Secretary of the
Commonwealth is required to inform all applicants of both the dates upon which the
Secretary received a complete application and the date the application was forwarded to the
Governor. Id. The Secretary is required to forward completed applications "within ninety
days after receipt." Id.
118. The short application for non-violent offenders specifically states that "[plersons who
have been convicted of a violent offense, a drug manufacturing offense or distribution offense
or an election law offense are not eligible for this process." Application for Restoration of
Rights, supra note 7.
119. See VA. CONST. art. V, § 12 (stating that the Governor has the authority "to remove
political disabilities"). The Supreme Court of Virginia has held that under the Virginia
Constitution, the Governor is the only political actor with the authority ultimately to grant
or to deny a removal of a felon's "political disabilities." In Re Iris Lynn Phillips, 574 S.E.2d
270, 273 (Va. 2003).
120. VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-231.2 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004) (describing the expedited
review process for the restoration of the right to vote).
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circuit court, who then make a recommendation to the Governor on
whether to grant or deny the right to vote."'2 In addition, the law
requires the Governor to act on the circuit court's recommendation
within ninety days of the court's decision.'22
The law establishes guidelines for non-violent felons petitioning
the circuit courts to have their right to vote restored. Specifically,
the law requires that the applicant demonstrate "civil responsibility
through community or comparable service; and that the petitioner
has been free from criminal convictions, excluding traffic infrac-
tions" during the five-year period following sentence completion. 2 '
The circuit court serves as a screening mechanism, which can
accelerate the application process. 24 If the circuit court approves
the non-violent felon's application, the order is sent to the Secretary
of the Commonwealth, who in turn submits the order to the
Governor, who has ninety-days to grant or deny the petitioner's
right to vote. 25 If the circuit court denies the application, the felon
still may apply directly to the Governor to have his eligibility to
vote restored, but the Governor is not required to act upon it within
ninety days of its receipt.'26 By giving non-violent felons the option
of first applying to the circuit courts, the current law ensures that
those felons who are eligible to have their voting rights restored will
have an expedited review of their application.
The current law was passed in 2000 largely in response to harsh
criticism of the previous restoration of rights process. Before the
voting restoration legislation and the restoration of rights process
implemented by Governor Warner in 2002, all felons had only the
121. Id.; see also Phillips, 574 S.E.2d at 273 (holding that the screening of petitions by
circuit courts does not constitute a separation of powers violation as the Governor has the
ultimate authority to grant or to deny a petition).
122. Id. (requiring the court to submit an order to the Secretary of the Commonwealth,
who must forward the order to the Governor).
123. Id. For non-violent felons wishing to have all of their rights restored, the wait to
apply is three years after sentence completion. See Application for Restoration of Rights,
supra note 7.
124. Phillips, 574 S.E.2d at 273 (finding the circuit courts' limited role is to determine
"whether a petitioner has presented competent evidence supporting the specified statutory
criteria"); see Gibson, supra note 95, at B2 (describing the law as establishing a "screening
process").
125. VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-231.2 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004).
126. See VA. CONST. art. V, § 12; see also Phillips, 574 S.E.2d at 273 (noting that a felon
is not obliged to petition the circuit court, but may directly petition the Governor).
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option of applying directly to the Governor to have their civil rights
restored, and the Governor did not have to act on the application
within any time frame.'27 Critics of this direct application process
argued that the difficulty of the process discouraged felons from
applying to have their voting rights restored. 128 Furthermore, less
than eight percent of restoration of rights applications were granted
in the twenty-five years prior to the enactment of the current law,
which expedites the restoration of non-violent felons' voting right.129
The current law applies only to non-violent felons wishing to
restore their voting rights. 3 ° To restore other rights, including the
right to serve on a jury, all felons must apply to the Governor.' 3 '
Although the Governor has instituted a quicker, easier process for
non-violent felons wishing to have all their rights restored, the
circuit courts do not serve as a screening mechanism for applicants
unless they only wish to restore their right to vote. 3 2 Thus, even if
a non-violent felon petitions the circuit court, the court recommends
the felon's voting rights be restored, and the Governor grants the
right to vote, the non-violent felon would still be required to fill out
a restoration of rights application through the Secretary of the
Commonwealth's office in order to be eligible to regain other civil
rights, including the right to serve on a jury."' Additionally, if a
non-violent felon wishes to petition the circuit court to regain the
right to vote, the felon must wait at least five years after completing
his sentence.' However, if the felon wishes to regain all of his civil
rights, including the right to vote, he may apply directly to the
Governor after three years."'
127. Id. (instilling the Governor with authority "to remove political disabilities").
128. See Gibson, supra note 95, at B2 (noting the lack of criteria to petition the Governor).
129. Id. (finding less than five thousand applicants had their rights restored before 2000).
130. VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-231.2 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004). Those convicted of violent
felonies, drug offenses, or election fraud are excluded.
131. See VA. CONST. art. V, § 12; VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-231.2 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004)
(limiting the statute's applicability to those wishing to have their voting rights restored).
132. See VA. CODEANN. § 53.1-231.2 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004) (limiting the circuit courts
in their ability to screen applicants who wish to have only their right to vote restored).
133. See id. To restore "political disabilities" other than the right to vote, the applicant
must petition the Governor. VA. CONST. art. V, § 12.
134. VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-231.2 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004) (requiring the applicant to
have completed any service, finish probation or parole five years prior to applying).
135. Application for Restoration of Rights, supra note 7. As Governor Warner has made
the restoration of rights process simpler for all convicted of non-violent felonies, it would
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C. Newly Proposed Legislation to Amend the Process to Regain
the Right to Vote in Virginia
Although the current law is an improvement upon regaining the
right to vote, it should also encompass the other rights a felon loses
upon conviction, such as the right to serve on a jury. In addition,
the wait to apply should either mirror the Governor's policy of
three years after completion of sentence, or make the wait shorter
than three years. Delegate Jerrauld Jones, who proposed the 2000
legislation expediting the process for non-violent felons wishing to
regain the right to vote, argues that additional changes to the
current law could make the law more effective. 3 ' Jones proposed
new legislation in 2002, applicable only to those felons petitioning
for their right to vote, that would permit non-violent felons to
petition the circuit court immediately upon the completion of
their sentence.'37 However, the bill was not passed before the end
of the General Assembly session. In 2003, the House Privileges
and Elections Committee passed a proposal for a constitutional
amendment that would give the General Assembly power to
establish a process whereby felons' rights could be restored, but the
Committee voted down the proposed constitutional amendment in
2004.138 In the opening of the 2005 session of the Virginia General
seem unlikely that non-violent felons would utilize the process established in VA. CODE ANN.
§ 53.1-231.2 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004) to have their voting rights restored, when they could
have all their rights restored two years sooner. Indeed Virginia's Department of Planning
and Budget has noted that only two of 1,403 restoration of rights applicants since 2000 have
utilized the statutory process to regain voting rights in VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-231.2 (West
2001 & Supp. 2004). Virginia Legislative Information System, Department of Planning and
Budget, 2005 Fiscal Impact Statement, available at http://legl.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp5O4.
exe?051+oth+HB2755F122+PDF (describing the fiscal impact H.B. 2755 would create by
amending VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-231.2 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004)).
136. See Gibson, supra note 95, at B2 (noting that Jones's statement that he would like
to eliminate the five-year waiting period so that those convicted of non-violent felonies could
immediately apply to have their rights restored).
137. H.B. 60,2002 Leg. (Va. 2002) (proposing to amend VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-231.2 (West
2001 & Supp. 2004) by eliminating the five-year waiting period for non-violent felons
petitioning to have their right to vote restored).
138. Tyler Whitley, Panel Reverses on Voting Rights for Felons, RICHMOND TIMES-
DISPATCH, Feb. 28, 2004, at A6 (noting that the House Privileges and Election Committee,
which had previously supported a constitutional amendment that would have given the
General Assembly power to establish a process whereby felons could regain their rights,
overwhelmingly disapproved of the measure in 2004).
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Assembly, Delegate Fenton Bland, Jr. introduced a bill similar to
the bill proposed by Delegate Jerrauld Jones. 3 s Delegate Bland's
bill would have eliminated the five-year waiting period for non-
violent felons wishing to have their right to vote restored.'40 The bill
was referred to the House Courts of Justice Committee but did not
make it out of committee before the end of the 2005 session. 14
1
The failed legislation would have expedited the restoration of
voting rights process for those convicted of committing a non-violent
felony. However, the failed legislation would not have eliminated
many of the problems associated with the current legislation. For
example, the failed legislation would not have allowed those
convicted of violent felonies, drug offenses, or election fraud to apply
for a restoration of their voting rights under the expedited
process. 4 2 Consequently, the failed legislation would have affected
only those convicted of non-violent felonies, a group that already
has a simplified application process under the current legislation 14
3
and Governor Warner's policy.
44
While the failed legislation would have improved upon current
legislation allowing non-violent felons an expedited process to
restore their voting rights, the failed legislation would not have
applied to other civil rights, such as the right to serve on a jury. The
failed legislation would have benefitted those non-violent felons
wishing to vote, but would not have allowed the felons to regain the
rest of their rights. Thus, both the current and failed legislation
place voting rights above other civil rights, as felons are required to
go through a separate process to regain the rest of their civil rights.
139. H.B. 2755, 2005 Leg. (Va. 2005) (proposing to amend VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-231.2
(West 2001 & Supp. 2004) by eliminating the five-year waiting period for non-violent felons
petitioning to have their right to vote restored).
140. Id. Delegate Bland introduced this bill days before resigning from the General
Assembly after pleading guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud. Jeffrey Kelley, Delegate
Resigns After Guilty Plea; Fenton L. Bland Jr. Had Committed Fraud to Fund Funeral
Home, Officials Say, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 27, 2005, at Al.
141. The Virginia Legislative Information System lists H.B. 2755 as failing in the House
Courts of Justice Committee. Virginia General Assembly, Legislative Information System,
Failed Legislation, available at http://www.leg.l.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?.051+com+
H8N06 (last visited Mar. 3, 2005).
142. See H.B. 2755,2005 Leg. (Va. 2005). The bill only amends the current legislation with
respect to time restraints placed on the applicant.
143. See VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-231.2 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004).
144. See Application for Restoration of Rights, supra note 7.
20051 2131
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Particularly with respect to the right to serve on a jury, neither the
current or failed legislation benefits the African American commu-
nity, where a quarter of the male population has been convicted of
a felony,'45 as it will not enable more African Americans convicted
of felonies to serve on juries.
IV. A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF THE RESTORATION OF RIGHTS
PROCESS
While this Note focuses on Virginia's felony exclusion law, the
majority of states also exclude felons from serving on juries.'46
Virginia, therefore, is a microcosm of national practice toward
felons, as most states impose collateral sanctions upon felons
reintegrating into society,'4 including stripping felons of the right
to serve as jurors. This Part will highlight national trends in felon
exclusion from juries using Virginia as a comparative benchmark.
In addition, this Part will address the policy concerns of felon
exclusion laws focusing on individualized treatment during criminal
proceedings and felon reintegration into society.
A. National Trends
Laws restricting juror qualifications have become less restrictive
since the 1940s when the Supreme Court began requiring that
juries be selected from a fair cross-section of the community.'4
145. See Restore Your Right to Vote, supra note 9 (noting that twenty-five percent of black
males in Virginia are disenfranchised due to felony convictions).
146. For a national view on felony disenfranchisement laws and their effect on jury
service, see Brian C. Kalt, The Exclusion of Felons from Jury Service, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 65,
65 (2003) (noting that "[thirty-one states and the federal government subscribe to the
practice of lifetime felon exclusion"). See also Joseph H. Kelley, Note, Restoration of Deprived
Rights, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 924, 926-30 (1969) (describing common rights lost by felons
under state laws, including the right to serve on a jury); Joan Petersilia, Parole and Prisoner
Reentry in the United States, 26 CRIME & JUST. 479, 509-10 (1999) (listing jury exclusion as
one of eight common civil penalties imposed on felons after serving their sentences).
147. See Sabra Micah Barnett, Commentary, Collateral Sanctions and Civil Disabilities:
The Secret Barrier to True Sentencing Reform for Legislatures and Sentencing Commissions,
55 ALA. L. REV. 375, 379-80 (2004) (arguing that civil disabilities imposed upon felons
released back into society disrupt the integration process and unfairly impose additional
penalties upon felons who have already completed their sentences).
148. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527 (1975) (requiring juries to be drawn from
a fair cross-section of the community); Kalt, supra note 146 at 186-88 (arguing that jury
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Unlike other juror qualification laws, laws restricting felons from
serving as jurors have not become less restrictive, but have
remained static.'49 Jurisdictions applying felon exclusion laws fall
into three general categories. 5 ' The vast majority of states exclude
felons for life-meaning felons are forever prohibited from serving
as jurors, or prohibited until they apply for and receive a restora-
tion of their rights from the state.' 5 ' Other states bar felons from
serving as jurors while they are imprisoned, and during the
subsequent supervisory period after release, but permit juror
service upon successful completion of probation. 5 2 Some states
exclude felons from serving as jurors only during the time the felon
is imprisoned.'53
Virginia is included in the majority of states that exclude felons
from serving as jurors for life.'54 Of the states that exclude felons
from serving as jurors, there are different methods states prescribe
to restore the rights denied to felons, including the right to serve on
a jury.'55 These methods include restoration: 1) by clemency, where
the head of the state government grants a pardon or officially
restores lost rights;156 2) by statute, where the law requires certain
lost rights to be restored at certain times;'57 3) through a decree of
composition has become more diverse since the 1940s as more people are participating as
jurors).
149. Kalt, supra note 146, at 187 (noting that the practice of excluding felons from serving
as jurors "represents an exception to general trends of liberalization concerning civil
disabilities").
150. See id. at 149 app. 1 (providing an analysis of felon exclusion laws from all fifty
states).
151. Id. at 149-50 (noting that thirty-one states and the federal government bar felons
from serving as jurors for life).
152. Id. (including time served in prison, on probation, or parole); see also Petersilia, supra
note 146, at 510 (finding that ten states exclude felons from jury service while the felon is
serving his sentence, and four states exclude felons for a period between one and four years
following sentence completion).
153. Kalt, supra note 146, at 150 (allowing felons to serve as jurors upon completion of a
prison sentence).
154. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-338 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004) (naming felons as a class
disqualified from serving as jury members).
155. See Kelley, supra note 146, at 930-32 (describing four different methods states use
to restore rights felons lose by law due to their status).
156. Id. at 930 (noting that clemency is the most common method states use to restore
rights, and that clemency includes many different forms including pardon or amnesty).
157. Id. at 930-31 (providing an example of rights being restored through a statute
endowing a felon with the rights lost at conviction when the felon completes his sentence).
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an adjudicative body, such as a parole board; 5 ' or 4) through a
combination of the above.'59 Virginia falls into the "clemency"
category, as only the Governor has the right to restore a felon's
rights. 6 ° Virginia permits a combination approach, however, with
respect to restoring felons' right to vote, as the law permits circuit
courts to review petitions for the right to vote and submit recom-
mendations to the Governor.'
B. National Policy Concerns Regarding Felon Exclusion Laws
Instead of reentering society with their debt paid, felons reenter
society with penalties they may continue to pay for the rest of their
lives, as they are often denied the right to vote, run for public office,
or serve on a jury.'62 After completing their sentence, most felons
are unaware of the collateral sanctions associated with their
conviction.'63 For example, a young first-time offender is more
likely to accept a guilty plea in order to avoid a prison sentence.
64
158. Id. at 931 (describing the power of certain administrative agencies or courts to restore
a lost right).
159. Id. at 931-32 (noting that some states use a combination of procedures to restore
rights, such as having an administrative agency recommend to an executive official that a
right be restored).
160. See VA. CONST. art. V, § 12 (providing the Governor with the sole authority "to
remove political disabilities").
161. In Virginia, a combination approach is used to restore the right to vote under VA.
CODE ANN. § 53.1-231.2 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004), as the circuit court is given authority to
recommend to the Governor that a felon's right to vote be restored.
162. Anthony C. Thompson, Navigating the Hidden Obstacles to Ex-Offender Reentry, 45
B.C. L. REv. 255, 273 (2004) (describing the experience of many felons who are unaware of
the collateral consequences that accompany their conviction, including the right to vote or
serve on ajury). Although beyond the scope of this Note, the American Bar Association (ABA)
proposes that collateral sanctions should be limited and imposed sparingly, subject to review
by a judge. In addition, the ABA encourages judges to take into account collateral sanctions
that operate by law when sentencing. See generally Margaret Colgate Love & Gabriel J.
Chin, Old Wine in a New Skin: The ABA Standards on Collateral Sanctions and
Discretionary Disqualification of Convicted Persons, 16 FED. SENTENCING REP. 232 (2002).
163. Thompson, supra note 162, at 272-23 (listing common consequences of a felony
conviction and stressing the lack of awareness of these consequences by both criminal
defendants and judges).
164. Andrew Shapiro, The Disenfranchised, THE AM. PROSPECT, Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 60-62
(discussing the lack of knowledge about felony exclusion laws and providing a hypothetical
describing how defendants unknowingly give up their right to vote by accepting a plea).
Critics of ending felony disenfranchisement laws point to the fact that their opponents focus
solely on the loss of the right to vote, not the loss of other rights-including the right to serve
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Only later when he is denied from serving on a jury or turned away
at the voting booth may he become aware of the full extent of his
guilty plea.
The rationale for the exclusion of felons from juries stems from
the belief that felons are less trustworthy and would be unable to
administer the law fairly.'65 However, this view is inconsistent with
the idea of reintegration and rehabilitation, both of which are
interests of the state.'66 Jury service is a forum that provides the
ultimate in representative government, as it allows community
members collectively to decide important issues within the commu-
nity.'67 By excluding felons that have served their sentences from
participating injuries, felons are marginalized within the commu-
nity. 8 The marginalization of felons from their communities due
to collateral consequences, such as jury exclusion, impedes the
ability of felons to transition back into society as they are denied a
stake in what happens in their communities.
169
on a jury-indicating that the advocacy is disingenuous as the focus on disenfranchisement
suggests winning votes for the liberal agenda is more important than securing actual rights.
See Glenn Richardson & Jerry Keen, Push to Let Felons Vote a Simple Power Ploy, THE
ATLANTA-J. CONST., Oct. 18, 2004, at 11A. Indeed, when Virginia amended its restoration
of rights process in 2000, the abbreviated procedure applied only to those seeking to regain
the right to vote. See VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-231.2 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004) (establishing a
shortened procedure to have the right to vote restored, but leaving the lengthy procedure to
have other rights restored intact).
165. See Nora V. Demleitner, Symposium, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for
Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 153, 158-59
(1999) (analogizing the state's treatment of felons to groups historically excluded from
political participation, including women and minorities).
166. See Petersilia, supra note 146, at 511 (noting that states spend millions of dollars on
rehabilitation programs to help felons ease into society upon release, yet also impose
collateral sanctions upon offenders that impinge upon the goal of rehabilitative services).
167. Although focusing on civil juries, Phoebe A. Haddon, Rethinking the Jury, 3 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 29,54-55 (1994), equates jury participation to a parliament, where people
come together to decide issues for the community.
168. See Thompson, supra note 162, at 273 (arguing that collateral sanctions, such as
denial of the right to serve on a jury, serve as a barrier to felons' successful reintegration into
society as they are separated from non-felons in exercising their rights as citizens).
169. Depriving felons of the right to vote or the right to serve on a jury through a
collateral sanction is a denial of the most basic forms of representative government. See
Barnett, supra note 147, at 383 (noting that collateral sanctions impede integration into
society and encourage recidivism).
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V. ASSESSING THE CURRENT LAW FROM A CRIMINAL AND CIVIL
PERSPECTIVE
A. Felons as Jurors in Criminal Cases
Under Governor Warner's policy, Virginians convicted of non-
violent felonies can become eligible to serve on a jury three years
after their conviction. Violent felons, drug offenders, and those
convicted of election fraud also have the opportunity to apply for a
restoration of civil rights and thus may become eligible for jury
service. According to Virginia prosecutors who were ordered by a
circuit court to refrain from criminal record or driver history checks
on prospective jurors, however, all felons should be kept out of the
jury box.'° The state's policy argument is based on the premise that
a convicted felon may be sympathetic toward a criminal defendant
and thus may not be able to serve impartially as a juror.1'1 Indeed,
the Supreme Court has ruled that the Sixth Amendment requires
that a jury be impartial for both the accused and the state.'72
Additionally, the Virginia Court Rules require trial courts to
determine whether a jury member can serve impartially as to both
the defendant and the Commonwealth. 3 Thus, as the government
would argue, the state has as much of a right to an impartial jury
as does the criminal defendant.'74
Given the government's right to an impartial jury and the their
belief that felons cannot serve impartially, the government argues
that felons should be excluded automatically from jury service.
Arguing that convicted felons are likely to be biased against the
170. See Memorandum Re: Use of Jury Lists (Va. Cir. Ct. Loudoun County June 2, 1998)
(arguing that felons are inherently biased toward the state).
171. Id. (noting that the state has a right to an impartial jury).
172. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474,483 (1990) (stating the impartiality goal of the Sixth
Amendment is applicable to both the accused and the state).
173. VA. CT. R. 3A: 14 (requiring the court to examine prospective jurors to determine if
any would be unable to provide an impartial adjudication); see also VA. CONST. art. I, § 8
(stating that the accused in criminal prosecutions has a right to an impartial jury).
174. See Lance Salyers, Invaluable Tool vs. Unfair Use of Private Information: Examining
Prosecutors' Use of Jurors' Criminal History Records in Voir Dire, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1079, 1081 (1999) (arguing that background checks of prospective jurors should be permitted
to ensure both the state and the defendant receive a fair trial).
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Commonwealth, the government claims that having felons serve
as jury members would unduly burden the Commonwealth in trying
to obtain a conviction against a criminal defendant. 7 ' Excluding
felons from juries, however, is unnecessary for the government to
achieve its purpose of having an impartial jury, given the state's
ability to use peremptory strikes and strikes for cause during the
voir dire process. Lastly, the government's argument, without foun-
dation, assumes that all felons hold thoughts of prejudice toward
the state.
1. The State's Policy Ignores Existing Court Rules That Remove
Biased Jurors
Disallowing convicted felons to serve as jury members may be
unnecessary, as any jury member who is biased may be struck for
cause by the judge or by use of a peremptory strike. During voir
dire, the judge and attorneys have the right to examine prospective
jury members, particularly to discover if the prospective jury
member has "expressed or formed any opinion, or is sensible of any
bias or prejudice therein."17 Any party who objects to a prospective
jury member for fear of the juror's bias can introduce evidence to
support the objection and can have the jury member removed by
the court for cause.'77 The government, therefore, can object to a
prospective jury member who had been convicted previously of a
felony if the jury member has indicated any sort of prejudice toward
the state. If the judge finds the convicted felon does harbor some
bias, the judge must excuse the jury member.
Furthermore, the government in criminal prosecutions, the
plaintiff in civil actions, and the defendant in either setting are
entitled to strike prospective jury members for no cause during voir
dire until the appropriate number of jury members remain. 7 ' In a
Virginia felony case, twenty prospective jury members are sum-
175. See Memorandum Re: Use of Jury Lists (Va. Cir. Ct. Loudoun County June 2, 1998)
(contending that a denial to conduct background checks on prospective jurors would create
a jury impartial to the state).
176. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-358 (West 2003) (providing the court and counsel for both
parties the right to examine prospective jurors).
177. Id. (requiring the court to conclude the prospective juror is not indifferent).
178. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-262 (West 2003) (permitting each party to strike a certain
number of prospective jurors for no cause).
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moned for service and examined during voir dire.'79 Twelve jurors
are then required to serve as the jury."0 Therefore, each party may
peremptorily strike up to four prospective jurors. If a felon serving
as a prospective juror does not demonstrate any prejudice toward
the government and is not struck for cause, the government still
has the option of striking the juror by using a peremptory strike.
Due to the highly unlikely chance that more than four prospective
jurors in a criminal trial would be convicted felons, the government
still can achieve its goal of eliminating convicted felons from the
jury box through the usual voir dire process.
Although Virginia prosecutors can use their peremptory strikes
to excuse convicted felons from the jury box, the Supreme Court
requires that a jury be selected from a fair cross-section of the
community.181 Thus, an outright prohibition on felons serving as
jury members may violate the three-prong fair cross-section test
laid out in Duren v. Missouri.'82 Under Duren, in any criminal case
the state cannot deny the accused his Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights if the accused can show that felons are a distinct
group, that felons' representation in the jury box is unfair and
unreasonable in comparison with the percentage of felons in the
community, and that this unfair and unreasonable representation
of felons in the jury box is due to the state's systematic exclusion of
felons from the jury selection process.' 83 The use of strikes for cause
and peremptory strikes, therefore, may be the only constitutionally
sound way to ensure that both the state and the defendant each
have an impartial jury.
179. Id. (requiring twenty prospective jurors to be called for a felony case).
180. Id. (requiring twelve jurors to serve as a jury in a felony case).
181. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,527 (1975) (requiringjuries to be drawn from a fair
cross-section of the community).
182. 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). To establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section
requirement, the allegedly excluded group must be distinct in the community; the number
of people in this group in the overall community as compared with the number of people
serving on juries must be unfair and unreasonable; and the underrepresentation of this
distinct group in the jury pool must be due to the state's systematic exclusion. Id.
183. See id.
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2. The State's Policy Assumes All Convicted Felons Are Biased
The government's belief that convicted felons are likely to be
biased jury members may be an overstatement. For instance, a
jury member who previously had been convicted of selling mari-
juana would, in all likelihood, be able to consider impartially the
conviction of someone accused of rape. The government's fear of
bias hinges on the idea that all convicted felons share a sort of
camaraderie with those accused of any kind of crime. Research by
psychologists Tom R. Tyler and Yuen J. Huo, however, suggests
otherwise.'84 Tyler and Huo's research indicates that acceptance of
legal decisions is shaped by personal views of procedural fairness
and observation of an authority figure's motive.'85 In their study,
they asked respondents to consider their personal experience with
law enforcement and the courts and whether the outcome of the
proceedings was fair. Over seventy percent of the respondents
indicated they thought law enforcement and the courts followed fair
procedures and that they had been treated fairly.8 6 Therefore,
those convicted of felonies called to serve as jury members are not
likely to associate their conviction with a universal belief that all
criminal defendants are being treated unfairly by the state.
B. Felons as Jurors in Civil Cases
Even if the government's argument that non-violent offenders,
violent offenders, drug offenders, and election fraud offenders
serving on juries would bias the jury against the government in a
criminal case were well-founded, the government's argument is
significantly less persuasive when it comes to banning convicted
felons from serving on jury trials in civil cases. In a civil proceeding,
a jury is not required but may be requested by either party or by
184. TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. Huo, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS (2002) (studying societal attitudes toward law
enforcement and courts).
185. Id. at 49-50, 58-59 (questioning those who had been involved with a police or court
proceeding).
186. Id. at 53. Sixty-two percent of those surveyed believed they received the outcome they
deserved, while sixty-six percent perceived the outcome as fair under the law. Id.
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the court.187 If a jury is requested, both parties have the right to
examine prospective jury members during voir dire in order to
determine if any prospective juror is harboring bias toward either
party that would prevent him from serving impartially."' 8 As in a
criminal proceeding, each side may question prospective jurors
regarding prejudice and may ask the judge to strike for cause those
harboring prejudice.18 Specifically, parties may ask prospective
jurors if they have "any interest in the cause, or ... expressed or
formed any opinion, or [are] sensible of any bias or prejudice."' 9° A
convicted felon, therefore, would be treated the same as other jury
members in a civil case in terms of whether the felon is harboring
bias that would make him unable to serve as a jury member.
Moreover, as in a criminal trial, parties in a civil proceeding are
entitled to peremptory strikes, whereby they can strike prospective
jurors from serving as jury members for virtually any reason. In
Virginia civil jury trials, up to thirteen prospective juror members
can be summoned, and each side may strike up to three prospective
jurors using their peremptory strikes.'9 ' Therefore, both parties
have the opportunity to prevent convicted felons from serving on
the jury using a peremptory strike in the event the felon did not get
struck for cause.
Unlike a criminal trial, there is no government entity for a felon
to harbor prejudice against during a civil proceeding. While a
convicted felon serving as a prospective juror could harbor preju-
dice against one of the parties, this bias will most likely manifest
itself during the voir dire process. A convicted felon serving as a
jury member in a civil proceeding, therefore, is not likely to be
harboring any more prejudice against one of the parties than any
other prospective jury member. Consequently, eliminating convicted
felons from civil jury service seems particularly unnecessary, as
each jury member's ability to serve impartially is dependent upon
187. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-336 (West 2003) (permitting the court to deny or to grant a
party's request for a jury in a civil trial).
188. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-358 (West 2003) (allowing the court and parties to question any
prospective juror).
189. Id. (allowing the court or either party to question prospective jurors regarding
whether the prospective juror is related to any party or is harboring bias).
190. Id.
191. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-359, -360 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004) (describing the selection
process for jurors in civil trials).
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the specific issues involved in the civil proceeding, and not at all
upon their felony status.
192
C. Drug-Related Offenses and the Rate of Recidivism
Breaking down by race the percentage of prisoners confined for
drug offenses nationwide, a 1996 study by the Human Rights Watch
reported that African Americans compose nearly sixty-three per-
cent of those confined. 193 In Virginia, Governor Warner's policy
concerning restoration of civil rights excludes felons from applying
for expedited restoration of their civil rights if they have been
convicted of a drug-related offense, including manufacturing or
distributing drugs.' In addition, legislation to expedite the
restoration of voting rights excludes those convicted of a drug
offense.' 95 Mirroring national statistics, in Virginia, African
Americans compose the vast majority of those convicted of drug-
related charges.' 96 According to the Human Rights Watch, which
analyzed data presented to the Justice Department by Virginia in
1996, African Americans comprise more than eighty percent of
those serving jail sentences in the Commonwealth for a drug-
related crime.'97 Thus, the automatic ban on applying for an
expedited restoration of civil rights for those convicted of drug
related offenses disparately affects the African American commu-
nity with respect to jury composition, as the number of African
Americans eligible to vote, and thus eligible to serve as jurors, is
greatly diminished.
192. See Educ. Books, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 349 S.E.2d 903,905-06 (Va. Ct. App. 1986)
(holding that impartiality in a civil case is dependent upon the particular circumstances and
issues in each individual case).
193. Human Rights Watch of the Sentencing Project, Punishment and Prejudice: Racial
Disparities in the War on Drugs pt. VI (2000), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2000/usa/
Rcedrg0O-04.htm#P289_60230 (reporting that the "war on drugs" disproportionately affects
African Americans).
194. VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-231.2 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004) (excluding those convicted of
drug offenses).
195. See Application for Restoration of Rights, supra note 7 (excluding those convicted of
drug offenses).
196. Steven A. Holmes, Race Analysis Cites Disparity in Sentencing for Narcotics, N.Y.
TIMES, June 8, 2000, at A14 (reporting the findings of Human Rights Watch).
197. Id. (citing the study's prominent findings with respect to individual states).
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1. Distinctions Between Non-Violent, Violent, and Drug-
Related Felony Convictions
In fiscal year 2001, the Virginia Department of Corrections
reported that the Commonwealth was confining 4,549 prisoners for
drug-related offenses and expected 2,279 drug-related offense
prisoners as new court admissions in that year.198 In that report,
the Department of Corrections lists drug-related offenses below
non-violent and violent offenses in order of most serious offenses. 99
Yet both the current law, the failed legislation as to voting right
restoration, as well as Governor Warner's policy for restoration of
civil rights, treat felons convicted of drug offenses more harshly
than those convicted of non-violent felonies. Specifically, those
convicted of non-violent felonies have the opportunity to apply to
the Governor for a restoration of their civil rights three years after
sentence completion, through an expedited and simplified process,
whereas those convicted of drug offenses can only apply to the
Governor using a complicated process with no guarantee that any
action will be taken for such restoration.2 °0 Although the Depart-
ment of Corrections seems to define non-violent felonies as more
serious than drug offenses,20 ' both the current law and the proposed
legislation regarding voting rights, as well as Governor Warner's
policy, treat those convicted of drug-related felonies the same as
those convicted of violent felonies-that is, more harshly than those
convicted of non-violent felonies. Accordingly, those who have been
convicted of drug-related offenses cannot take advantage of the
expedited restoration of voting rights process available to those
convicted of non-violent felonies.
198. Va. Dep't of Corr., Facts & Figures, Annual Statistical Summaries, Population by
Most Serious Offense (2001), available at http://www.vadoc.state.va.us/resources/statistics/
researchlstatsum_01/0loffense.htm [hereinafter Va. Dep't of Corr., Population by Most
Serious Offense]. The Virginia Department of Corrections reports that it is confining 29,196
inmates; ofthese, 19,262 are African Americans, and 18,082 are African American males. Va.
Dep't of Corr., Facts & Figures, Annual Statistical Summaries, Population by Gender & Race
(2001), available at httpJ/www.vadoc.state.va.us/resources/statistics/research/statsum
0101gender.htm [hereinafter Va. Dep't of Corr., Population by Gender and Race].
199. Va. Dep't of Corr., Population by Most Serious Offense, supra note 198 (noting that
law enforcement considers drug offenses as being less serious than non-violent felonies).
200. See supra Part III (discussing the restoration of rights processes applicable to those
convicted of different types of felonies).
201. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
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2. Rates of Recidivism
The harsh treatment of those convicted of drug-related offenses
may be related to recidivism rates associated with drug crimes. The
Virginia Department of Corrections tracked prisoners released in
1998 to determine whether the felons would become involved in
criminal activity again and thus be subject to re-incarceration.20 2
The study found that of those who recidivated, less than nine
percent of those convicted of non-violent felonies returned to prison,
while twenty-five percent of those convicted of drug related offenses
returned to prison." 3 The study also found that for those who
recidivate, most return to prison within two years of release.0 4
Despite the fact that those convicted of drug-related offenses
have a higher rate of recidivism, the exclusion of drug offenders
from Governor Warner's expedited review policy for restoring civil
rights is unnecessary. Governor Warner requires non-violent felony
applicants to be "free of any sentence, including any suspended
sentence, probation or parole for at least three years. ""' Thus, a
drug offender who engages in criminal activity within two years
after finishing his sentence for the drug offense would not be
eligible under Governor Warner's short application.20 6 The distinc-
tion between non-violent felons and felons convicted of drug related
offenses, therefore, is unwarranted and unduly burdens African
Americans as they constitute the vast majority of those felons
convicted of drug-related offenses.20 7
202. Va. Dep't of Corr., Study, Recidivism in Virginia: Tracking the 1998 Release Cohort,
14 INSIDE OuT 4 (2003), available at http://www.vacure.org/docs/vacurenl2003-08.pdf
(discussing the primary findings of the study) [hereinafter Va. Dep't of Corr., Tracking the
1998 Release Cohort]. The complete study can be found at VA. DEP'T OF CORR., RECIDIVISM
IN VIRGINIA: TRACKING THE 1998 RELEASE COHORT (2003), available at http://www.
vadoc.state.va.us/resources/statistics/research/recidivism03.doc.
203. Va. Dep't of Corr., Tracking the 1998 Release Cohort, supra note 202.
204. See id. (finding that 8.9% recidivated in 1998, 38.5% in 1999, and 35.5% in 2000).
205. Sec'y of the Commonwealth, Application for Restoration of Rights, supra note 7
(requiring an applicant to have a three-year clean record before applying).
206. Id.
207. See Holmes, supra note 196, at A14 (noting that African Americans constitute an
overwhelming portion of the population serving a sentence for a drug-related offense).
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VI. VIRGINIA JURY PROCEDURE AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
There are several constitutional issues that question the validity
of Virginia's current restoration of civil rights process. First, the
law may not meet constitutional muster, as the Supreme Court has
held that a criminal defendant must be offered a jury composed of
his peers in order to preserve the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right, through the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause.2"8 Because Virginia's restoration of civil rights process has
such an adverse effect on the exercising of rights of the African
American community, it may result in purposeful discrimination
and may deny a criminal defendant a jury chosen from a represen-
tative community pool. Second, because prospective jurors are
screened for eligibility to vote and thus to serve on a jury, the
Commonwealth may be invading a felon's right to privacy if the
felon could show the prospective jury questionnaire was intrusive
and not relevant to the felon's ability to serve impartially.2"9
A. A Jury of One's Peers and Due Process
The Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment, through
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, requires
that a criminal defendant be offered a jury composed of his peers.2 '0
In Batson v. Kentucky, the prosecution used its peremptory strikes
to eliminate all four African American prospective jurors.21 ' In
response, the Supreme Court concluded that the state could not
so purposefully deny a specific race from serving on a jury.212 The
Court stressed that purposeful discrimination during venire
selection can occur under the guise of a neutral state statute,
208. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303,308 (1879) (requiring juries to be composed
of peers of the accused).
209. See Brandborg v. Lucas, 891 F. Supp. 352, 361 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (holding that
questions asked of prospective jury members must be non-biased and relevant to the case).
210. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986) (finding that eliminating all African
Americans from the jury box violated the African American defendant's right to equal
protection).
211. Id. at 83 (leaving a jury composed of only white members).
212. Id. at 86. The Court stated: "Competence to serve as a juror ultimately depends on
an assessment of individual qualifications and ability impartially to consider evidence
presented at a trial." Id. at 87.
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stating that "where the procedures implementing a neutral
statute operated to exclude persons from the venire on racial
grounds," the defendant is denied his right to equal protection.213
The Virginia statute forbidding convicted felons from serving as
jury members until their civil rights are restored is neutral on its
face. The law, however, has discriminatory effects, as it dispropor-
tionately impacts African Americans.21 4 In 2001, the Virginia
Department of Corrections' annual statistics confirmed that African
Americans compose approximately sixty-five percent of all con-
fined prisoners.21' Thus, African Americans are more likely to be
disproportionately applying to have their voting rights restored.
Even though African Americans compose nearly one-fifth of
Virginia's population,216 they are more than twice as likely as other
Virginia residents to be affected by the restoration of civil rights
process and thus to be denied the ability to serve on a jury.
The Supreme Court has affirmed the constitutionality of some
voter disenfranchisement laws. In Richardson v. Ramirez,21 7 the
Court upheld a California statute that denied voting rights to
felons.2"8 The Supreme Court interpreted Section 2 of the Four-
teenth Amendment as not guaranteeing convicted felons the right
to vote. 21 9 The Court also noted that states may take residence, age,
and criminal records into consideration when determining stan-
213. Id. at 88 (citation omitted) (disallowing any procedure where a specific race is
eliminated from serving as a juror).
214. See Pierre Thomas, Study Suggests Black Male Prison Rate Impinges on Political
Process, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 1997, at A3 (citing a report by The Sentencing Project finding
that an estimated 1.46 million out of 10.4 million African American males nationwide are
ineligible to vote and, consequently, to serve on a jury in Virginia and many other states, due
to felony convictions).
215. Va. Dep't of Corr., Population by Gender and Race, supra note 198 (confirming that
African Americans compose the vast majority of confined inmates).
216. U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division, Virginia Population Estimates by Sex, Race
and Hispanic or Latino Origin: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2002 (release date Sept. 18, 2003),
available at http'//www.census.gov/popest/archives/2000s/vintage_2002/ST-EST2002-ASRO-
05.html (providing population information by race and gender).
217. 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (upholding the practice of denying felons voting rights).
218. Id. at 56 (allowing felon disenfranchisement when the laws are applied consistently).
219. Id. at 54. The Court relied on the language in Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which provides that the State may not deny the right to vote to any citizen,
except those who have participated "in rebellion, or other crime." Id. at 42 (alteration in
original) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2).
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dards for voter qualifications.22 ° Thus, the Court concluded that the
state did not deny the defendant equal protection of the law in
Ramirez.22'
Although the Court has validated some disenfranchisement laws
like that in Ramirez, it has also been willing to strike them down
on the basis of violating the Equal Protection Clause. In Hunter v.
Underwood,222 the Court held that a challenged section of the
Alabama State Constitution, which disenfranchised those convicted
of crimes of moral turpitude, violated the Equal Protection
Clause.223 The Court applied a two-prong test, which the opponent
of the state action must use to establish, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that a racially neutral law violates the Equal Protection
Clause. First, the opponent of the law must show that the law has
had a racially discriminatory impact;22 and second, the opponent
must prove that the law was enacted for a racially discriminatory
purpose or with an intent to discriminate.225 Applying Hunter's
two-prong test, a convicted felon in Virginia could challenge the
restoration of civil rights process on equal protection grounds if he
shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the law is based on
a discriminatory purpose and that it disparately impacts the
African American community. The discriminatory purpose require-
ment may be easier to prove, because Virginia is a southern state.
As disenfranchisement laws have their roots in the Reconstruction
era, and as Virginia was a Jim Crow state,226 those challenging the
law could argue that the Commonwealth enacted the law under
purported legitimate reasons but with the actual intent to disen-
220. Id. at 53 (quoting Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51
(1959)) (finding that states may exclude some groups from voting).
221. Id. at 56 (holding that the state may uniformly deny felons the right to vote).
222. 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (holding that statutes restricting voting rights must not be
racially motivated).
223. Id. at 233 (finding the statute was enactedtorestrict AfricanAmericans from voting).
224. Id. at 227 (noting that a neutral law that has a disparate impact will be subject to
Equal Protection analysis).
225. Id. at 227-28 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
264-65 (1977)) (finding that where a law is neutral on its face, the law must be shown to be
racially motivated to violate the Equal Protection Clause).
226. For a history of race relations in Virginia during the Jim Crow period, see J. DOUGLAS
SMITH, MANAGING WHITE SUPREMACY: RACE, POLITICS, AND CITIZENSHIP IN JIM CROW
VIRGINIA (2002).
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franchise African Americans.22 Disparate impact may be proven by
showing that the law denies one in four African Americans the right
to serve as a jury member.22
B. The Right to Privacy
The Supreme Court recognized the right to privacy as a
penumbral right of the Ninth Amendment229 in Griswold v.
Connecticut."' When prospective jurors are called for jury service
in a criminal trial, the prosecution is afforded an opportunity to run
a criminal background check on all of them before the trial
begins.23' Through this process, the prosecution can eliminate
prospective jurors convicted of felonies.2"2 By prying into a prospec-
tive juror's history, however, the Commonwealth may be violating
the prospective juror's right to privacy.233
227. To prove the Commonwealth's discriminatory intent in determining eligibility forjury
service, challengers ofVirginia's restoration of voting rights process could point to the history
surrounding the law's enactment, under a totality of the circumstances test. Specifically, if
the law was originally enacted during the Jim Crow era, the history would serve as evidence
of the state's discriminatory intent. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267 (stating that
historical background may be an evidentiary source to show discriminatory purpose).
228. See Felons File Lawsuit to Challenge Vote Law, supra note 9, at B2; Losing the Vote,
supra note 91, pt. III.
229. U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, ofcertain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.").
230. 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (holding the right to privacy is an enumerated right of
the Ninth Amendment).
231. Salmon v. Virginia, 529 S.E.2d 815, 818-19 (Va. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that the
Commonwealth may obtain and review criminal background information on potential jurors).
In Salmon, the court relied on Virginia Code § 19.2-389(A)(1), which states that criminal
record information is to be circulated only among officers or employees of criminal justice
agencies. Salmon, 529 S.E.2d at 818-19. The Commonwealth may not run background checks
on prospective jurors in Loudon County. After the practice was challenged by a criminal
defendant, the Chief Justice of the twentieth circuit issued a procedural rule that prohibited
the use of jury lists for background checks. See Salyers, supra note 174, at 1084-87.
232. Salmon, 529 S.E.2d at 819. Salmon argued that the prosecution had an unfair
advantage in being able to remove prospective jurors who could be sympathetic toward him.
Id.; see also Paula L. Hannaford, Safeguarding Juror Privacy: A New Framework for Court
Policies and Procedures, 85 JUDICATURE 18,22-23 (2001); Salyers, supra note 174, at 1092-93.
233. The prosecution has the ability to screen prospective jurors through many different
forums, including the Virginia Crime Information Network and the Virginia Department of
Motor Vehicles. See Memorandum Re: Use of Jury Lists (Va. Cir. Ct. Loudoun County June
2, 1998).
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Before actually being called to serve as a jury member, those on
the master jury list are asked to answer a questionnaire, which
asks if they have been convicted of a felony.234 In Brandborg v.
Lucas,235 the petitioner received a questionnaire for jury selection
that contained over one hundred questions.236 The petitioner failed
to answer twelve questions, submitting a note to the Judge that
she thought the questions to be of a "private nature" that had "no
relevance" to her ability to serve impartially.23 v Summoned to
service, the court instructed the petitioner to answer the questions
in writing and held the petitioner in contempt when she refused to
comply with the court's orders.238 Accepting the petitioner's writ of
habeas corpus challenging the contempt conviction, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas held that a
juror's right to privacy must be examined by weighing it against the
right of each party involved to an impartial jury.239 The Court held
that questionnaires must be screened to ensure each question asked
of the prospective juror is relevant to the case and is an unbiased
question.24 ° If relevance is established and the juror still objects to
the question on invasion of privacy grounds for fear of public
disclosure of private information, the juror should be instructed of
the option of having her answer recorded in camera in the presence
of only the judge and attorneys involved.24'
Under the District Court's logic, those convicted of felonies
could object to the relevance of their prior conviction in a court
proceeding. The court would have to weigh the interests of the
parties involved in determining whether the prospective juror's
right to privacy has been violated. In a criminal case, the court
would have to weigh the interest of the public, which may outweigh
234. Id. (describing the process where jury lists are created).
235. 891 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (requiring prospective jurors to answer questions
determined relevant, but requiring the court to provide the least intrusive way to comply).
236. Id. at 353.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 354-55.
239. Id. at 360 (requiring judges to determine the relevance of a question any time a
prospective juror evokes a privacy concern).
240. Id. (requiring courts to determine the relevance of all questions prior to the
questionnaires being submitted to prospective jurors).
241. Id. (requiring that the prospective juror be offered the least intrusive method of
responding).
[Vol. 46:21092148
A JURY OF ONE'S PEERS
the prospective juror's privacy interest in keeping his felony
conviction unknown. In a civil case, however, there is no public
interest to weigh. Having a juror with a prior felony conviction is
irrelevant to a dispute between two community members, as the
parties involved are under no threat of state prosecution.
Theoretically, all convicted felons who have not had their civil
rights restored should be dismissed from the jury pool, based solely
on the questionnaire that would require the prospective juror to
indicate whether or not he had been convicted of a felony or had his
rights restored. However, many respondents do not correctly mark
their questionnaires, due to a lack of education or an inability to
understand the questions asked of them. These felons who slip past
the preliminary screening can then be called upon to serve as jury
members.242 Once erroneously called upon to serve, convicted felons
are subject to questioning by the judge and attorneys, as part of the
public record.2 43 Although felony convictions are public record,
felons who are erroneously summoned for jury duty are subject to
undue public attention when their past felony convictions become
known during the voir dire process.244 Being singled out for their
past crime in front of fellow community members, felons summoned
as prospective jurors consequently are punished by the Common-
wealth again, even though they have already completed their
sentence.245
CONCLUSION
Under Governor Warner's policy for restoring felons' civil rights,
as well as the system for felons wishing to restore only their right
242. As serving on ajury is a compulsory duty imposed on eligible citizens, those convicted
felons who incorrectly fill out their questionnaires prior to being called are not assumed to
be subverting the judicial system.
243. See Hannaford, supra note 232, at 24. Hannaford cites a 1991 study that found that
twenty-five percent ofjurors questioned during voir dire did not report their prior criminal
convictions or those of their family members when asked to do so in court. Id. at 23.
244. See Nancy J. King, Nameless Justice: The Case for the Routine Use of Anonymous
Juries in Criminal Trials, 49 VAND. L. REV. 123, 125 (1996) (noting that jury service exposes
jurors to "exploitation by the press, ... retaliatory threats, and unwanted attention").
245. See George P. Fletcher, Disenfranchisement as Punishment: Reflections on the Racial
Use of Infamia, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1895, 1898-99 (1999) (arguing that convicted felons are
treated as the "untouchables" of society and as "unreliable members of the democracy ...
banished from the political community").
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to vote under current Virginia law, the process is simplified for
those convicted of non-violent felonies.2 46 Even under the simplified
process, the earliest a felon may apply to restore his rights is three
years after completion of his sentence.24 v Virginia's General
Assembly should reform the entire restoration of rights process to
make it easier for all convicted felons to regain their civil rights.
Specifically, the distinction between non-violent felons and those
felons convicted of violent felonies, drug-related offenses, and
election fraud need to be eliminated so that all felons who have
served their sentences can enjoy the rights that the rest of Vir-
ginia's citizens enjoy. Currently, while non-violent felons are
guaranteed action by the Governor on their petition for a restora-
tion of their civil rights, those convicted of violent felonies are
required to fill out a longer and more complicated application with
no guarantee that the Governor will act on their application.248
Under this process, those felons ineligible for the shorter, expedited
review can be permanently denied civil rights although they have
served their sentence and remained crime-free.
The current restoration of rights process is particularly harsh on
the African American community. As a disproportionate number of
African American men are convicted felons-and therefore have lost
their civil rights, including the right to serve on a jury-jury pools
have a diminished number of eligible African American jurors. Due
to this diminished number of eligible African American jurors, an
African American criminal defendant may not be guaranteed a jury
of his peers due to the disparate impact the restoration of rights
process has on the African American community. 9
By making it easer for all felons to apply to have their civil rights
restored, more felons would become eligible for jury service. This
in turn would benefit Virginia's African American community, in
246. See Application for Restoration of Rights, supra note 7; VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-231.2
(West 2001 & Supp. 2004) (stating the restoration of rights policy of the Governor and the
restoration of voting rights law, both of which have a simplified process for non-violent
felons).
247. See Application for Restoration of Rights, supra note 7. Only non-violent felons free
from any subsequent convictions are qualified to apply for a restoration of rights within three
years of the completion of their sentence. Id.
248. See Application for Restoration of Rights, supra note 7 (noting that the short form
application is only available for those convicted of non-violent felonies).
249. See supra Part N.A.
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which one in four men is a convicted felon. In addition, the jury
selection pool would become a more accurate reflection of Virginia's
communities, as more African Americans would become eligible for
jury service. These proposed changes to the restoration of civil
rights process would promote equal application of justice in all
trials, benefitting both African Americans specifically and Virginia's
population as a whole.
Amanda L. Kutz

A DEVIL DISGUISED AS A CORPORATE ANGEL?:
QUESTIONING CORPORATE CHARITABLE
CONTRIBUTIONS TO "INDEPENDENT" DIRECTORS'
ORGANIZATIONS
A director's greatest virtue is the independence which allows
him or her to challenge management decisions and evaluate
corporate performance from a completely free and objective
perspective. A director should not be beholden to management
in any way.1
INTRODUCTION
Enron.2 WorldCom.3 Tyco.4 The accounting scandals surrounding
these former market giants5 have precipitated a revolution in
corporate governance6 the likes of which the nation has never seen.7
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 20028 ("Sarbanes-
1. Robert H. Rock, Caesar's Wife, 20 DIREcToRs & BOARDs 5,5 (1996) (former chairman
of National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD)).
2. Enron, "at its peak[,] reported annual revenue of$100 billion, employed 26,000 people
and started to build a gleaming new Houston headquarters." Robert Frank et al., Executives
on Trial: Scandal Scorecard, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2003, at B1. The company, now delisted
from the New York Stock Exchange, engaged in "aggressive accounting [techniques] to hide
massive debt and inflate the bottom line-enriching top executives in the process." Id.
3. Within WorldCom, "several top executives helped deep-fry the books to the tune of
$11 billion to hide costs and inflate profit and revenue over several years." Id. WorldCom
Inc., now known as MCI and under new leadership, filed for bankruptcy in July of 2002. Id.
4. Tyco's executives used corporate funds as their personal piggy bank, as demonstrated
by a $2 million birthday party thrown for the chief executive officer's wife. See id. With an
admitted $2 billion worth of accounting falsifications, the corporation has hired new directors
and executives in an attempt to regain its credibility. Id.
5. These are only some of the recent corporate scandals. For an excellent summary of
other highly publicized recent corporate scandals, see id.
6. For a discussion of corporate governance, see infra Part I.A.
7. Charles M. Elson & Christopher J. Gyves, The Enron Failure and Corporate
Governance Reform, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 855, 855-56 (2003).
8. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C.). The Act is named after its authors, who, interestingly, split
between party lines: Senator Paul Sarbanes, a Democrat from Maryland, and Representative
Michael Oxley, a Republican from Ohio. David S. Hilzenrath et al., How Congress Rode a
"Storm" to Corporate Reform, WASH. POST, July 28, 2002, at Al.
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Oxley") less than two months after the WorldCom debacle.9
Sarbanes-Oxley required the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) to demand that self regulated organizations (SROs), like the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD), promulgate new listing requirements
focusing on corporate governance measures. 10
At the heart of this new wave of reform is a call for more
independence within boards of directors.1' Sarbanes-Oxley requires
there to be independent directors on all auditing committees. 2 The
SROs have gone further and demand more of listed companies in
terms of director independence. 3 Yet this is only the beginning.
Institutional investors with significant market clout view Sarbanes-
Oxley and the new SRO regulations as only a starting point. For
example, one of the largest institutional investors in the country,
CalPERS, 4 has an extensive manual specifically defining what
kinds of directors they consider to be truly independent and
outlining how such directors should function. 5
Lurking beneath this global whirlwind" is an issue that has not
gained much attention in recent scholarship: corporate charitable
9. In June of 2002, "WorldCom admitted to what could turn out to be the biggest
accounting fraud ever." Shawn Young et al., WorldCom Files for Bankruptcy: Debt, Scandal
Overwhelm; Operations Set to Continue During a Reorganization, WALL ST. J., July 22, 2002,
at A3. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted on July 30, 2002, only nine days after WorldCom
filed for bankruptcy. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 1, 116 Stat. 745, 745
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7201).
10. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 775 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1) (requiring the SEC to act within 270 days of the enactment
of the Act).
11. See Lynne L. Dallas, The Multiple Roles of Corporate Boards of Directors, 40 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 781, 788 & n.21 (2003).
12. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 83-96.
14. "CalPERS" stands for the California Public Employees' Retirement System. As of
August 31, 2004, CaIPERS' investment portfolio was worth $165.3 billion. CaIPERS, Facts
at a Glance: Investments, at http://www.calpers.com/eip-docs/about/facts/investme.pdf (last
modified Aug. 31, 2004).
15. CaIPERS, Corporate Governance Core Principles & Guidelines: United States (Apr.
13,1998), at http:/www.calpers-governance.org/principles/domestictus/downloads/us-corpgov-
principles.pdf.
16. As one reporter has noted, "[uin the wake of spectacular collapses like Enron Corp.'s
and WorldCom Inc.'s, governments around the world are getting tougher on corporate
governance." Silvia Ascarelli, One Size Doesn't FitAll: In Europe, Corporate-Goverance Rules
Are Not in the Details, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2003, at R6.
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contributions.' 7 As noted above, many governmental, regulatory,
and institutional organizations have gone to great lengths to issue
proposals to arrest the apparent decline of corporate governance
standards. Few of them, however, have considered the likes of Ellen
Futter. Ellen Futter is the president of the American Museum of
Natural History in New York City and she "serves on four [corpo-
rate boards of directors]: insurer American International Group
Inc., pharmaceutical maker Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., the energy
company Consolidated Edison Inc. and J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.,
the nation's second-biggest bank."" During Futter's tenure as
President, the Museum of Natural History has received several
large donations from the corporations on whose boards Ms. Futter
sits.'9 Corporations such as these seek independence and credibility
in the boardroom by employing accomplished and well-respected
individuals, such as Ms. Futter, as directors.2" The individuals, of
course, have many reasons for serving as a director, but one cannot
17. One team of authors recognizes the issue in passing amidst its summary of the recent
changes in corporate governance. See Elson & Gyves, supra note 7, at 872-73 (recognizing
several large charitable donations from Enron Corp. to organizations with which some of the
company's directors were affiliated and stating that "[tihese relationships likely diminished
objectivity and consequently the ability of the directors to have appreciated the severity of
the red flags before them"). Slightly more attention has been given to this issue by authors
writing about general corporate charitable contributions, but these examinations tend to be
cursory and lack in-depth proposals for reform. The following excerpt is illustrative:
Donations to independent directors' charities could implicitly depend on their
exercising general oversight functions in a way that pleases management.
Indeed, a corporate board could be stacked with seemingly "independent"
directors (such as university, museum, and hospital administrators) whose
charitable organizations depend on inside directors' approval of corporate
donations. As the recent Enron scandal demonstrates, such compromise of
oversight functions can be disastrous.
Richard W. Painter, Commentary on Brudney and Ferrell, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1219, 1227-28
(2002); see also Nell Minow, Corporate Charity: An Oxymoron?, 54 BUS. LAW. 997 (1999)
(suggesting that the business judgment rule is too forgiving of corporate charitable
contributions). Nell Minow cites a $90 million donation from the Occidental Petroleum
Corporation to the Armand Hammer Museum of Art and Cultural Center as "one of the most
outrageous cases of corporate charity." Id. at 1001. Though the Occidental case did not
involve a donation to a director's organization but rather one to the CEO's pet charity, it
serves as an excellent example of how supposedly "disinterested" or "independent" directors
often fall to do their jobs.
18. David Bank & Joann S. Lublin, Giving at the Office: On Corporate Boards, Officials
from Nonprofits Spark Concern, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2003, at Al.
19. See id.
20. See id.
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overlook the opportunity for those individuals to fundraise for their
respective organizations through their special relationship with the
corporation and its leaders.
In the past, there were relatively few instances where the courts21
squarely confronted this ostensible conflict of interests.22 Recently,
however, the Delaware Chancery Court has dealt with the issue in
two cases that gained significant attention from the media. Though
corporate charitable contributions were not the primary issue in
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, the court did make a
determination in that case that director Father Leo J. O'Donovan,
the President of Georgetown University, was not influenced by
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Michael Eisner's charitable contribu-
tions to the university.23 The court acknowledged that Eisner had
made donations of over $1 million to the school since 1989, but it
quickly dismissed the plaintiffs' allegation that the donations
affected O'Donovan's independence as a director. 4 More recently,
the court took a completely different stance in In re Oracle Corp.
Derivative Litigation.25 In this lengthy opinion, the court thoroughly
analyzed the independence of two members of a special litigation
committee ("SLC") charged with considering allegations against
Oracle.26 The court noted a myriad of potential biases that could
have influenced the two committee members-both of whom were
distinguished professors at Stanford University-not the least of
which were large donations to Stanford from Oracle and its CEO,
Larry Ellison. Ultimately, Vice Chancellor Strine concluded that
21. Although the term "courts" is used, this Note focuses on the Delaware Chancery
Court. The Chancery Court is a key player in developing corporate governance standards,
as more than half of the Fortune 500 companies are incorporated in Delaware. See Marc
Gunther, Ovitz v. Eisner: Boards Beware!, FORTUNE, Nov. 10, 2003, at 171, 172.
22. Though there are surely other cases that touch on the subject, there is one case in
this area that is cited often. See Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962 (Del. Ch. 1985) (questioning
the independence of the former Governor of North Carolina and then President of Duke
University).
23. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 359 (Del. Ch. 1998).
24. Id.
25. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003).
26. Id. at 937-48.
27. See id. at 920-21.
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"these and other facts cause me to harbor a reasonable doubt about
the impartiality of the SLC."28
It is the purpose of this Note to draw attention to the inevitable
conflicts that arise when a leader of a nonprofit organization sits on
a for-profit board, and to suggest a way in which to deal with the
problem. The primary focus of this Note is on how the courts handle
this issue and the ways in which they can improve the test they use
to question the independence of such directors. The Chancery Court
in Disney seemed to lack any concern that a Jesuit priest whose
primary task is raising funds for Georgetown University could be
influenced by corporate donations. 29 This Note argues that the
Chancery Court should have been more inquisitive with respect to
O'Donovan's conflicts in Disney, and it contends that the Chancery
Court made the correct determination in Oracle only through a
long-winded opinion that over-emphasized the minutiae in the case.
This Note suggests that the court should apply a more streamlined
test to similar cases in the future.
Before detailing how a more streamlined test would operate, Part
I of this Note discusses the concept of corporate governance, the
evolution of the desire for "independent" directors, and presents an
explanation of why the courts care about whether a director is
independent. Part II discusses more thoroughly the Oracle and
Disney cases and their respective deficiencies. Finally, Part III
presents evidence as to how the problem of corporate quid pro quos
between seemingly untainted directors and the corporate boards on
which they sit is a growing one that will only become more impor-
tant as the call for adding independent board members continues.
This Note then concludes by suggesting a functional approach by
which the courts can effectively and efficiently deal with these
suspect corporate charitable contributions and their effect on a
director's independence.
28. Id. at 921. The two professors were the only members of the committee. Id. at 923-24.
For an explanation of what a special litigation committee is and how it fits into the concept
of corporate governance, see infra text accompanying notes 116-25.
29. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 359 (Del. Ch. 1998). The
Chancery Court seemed to give great weight to the fact that O'Donovan was forbidden to
collect a director's fee. To say that O'Donovan could not be influenced because he did not
accept personal fees completely disregards the fact that he was the president of, and thus the
chief fundraiser for, Georgetown.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Corporate Governance
Corporate governance"° is a concept that does not have a
straightforward definition. In a Wall Street Journal special report,
one expert put it simply: "Corporate governance is a hefty-sounding
phrase that really means oversight of a company's management
-making sure the business is run well and investors are treated
fairly."31 Others use a more elaborate definition, like the following:
"It [corporate governance] is the relationship among various
participants in determining the direction and performance of
corporations. The primary participants are (1) the shareholders, (2)
the management (led by the chief executive officer), and (3) the
board of directors."32 There is no doubt as to the significant role
management plays in this triangular relationship, but it is worth-
while to elaborate on the roles of the shareholders and the board of
directors in corporate governance.
1. Shareholders
It is important to realize that a shareholder may not be the
average American dabbling in the stock market. In the past,
"individual shareholders ... did not control enough stock to be
owners ... [and] had little direct leverage over the company's
strategic plans. Their only recourse was to observe the classic 'Wall
30. The need to develop a concept of governance did not exist until the concept of the
modern corporation was realized. As one scholar has noted, '[alt the turn of the century,
ownership and management were related. Powerful men both owned and exercised control
over major corporations." Charles W. Murdock, Corporate Governance-The Role of Special
Litigation Committees, 68 WASH. L. REV. 79, 80 (1993). It was not until Adolf Berle and
Gardiner Means first recognized a separation between ownership and control that the idea
of the modern corporation was born. See id. at 80-81 & n.2 (citing ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. &
GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 69-111 (1932)). As
the modern corporation evolved, so did the need for a system to hold the corporation
accountable to the individual shareholder. See id.
31. Judith Burns, Everything You Wanted to Know About Corporate Governance ... But
Didn't Know to Ask, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2003, at R6.
32. ROBERT A.G. MoNKs & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERANCE 1 (2d ed. 2001).
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Street Walk' and sell their shares."33 At the opposite end of the
spectrum from the average shareholder is the institutional in-
vestor.34 Surprisingly, until recently, "voting with their feet" was
how institutional investors voiced their opinions as well.35 However,
"[tihese institutional investors have become increasingly active in
corporate governance because exit has become a less viable option
and norms have changed concerning the appropriateness of their
participation in corporate governance."36 It is not surprising that
having become so involved with corporate governance, these
investors put a high value on the concept.37 A recent survey found
that investors are willing to pay up to a fourteen percent premium
33. CAROLYN KAY BRANCATO, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
BEST PRACTICES FOR INCREASING CORPORATE VALUE, at xix (1997).
34. Cf MONKS & MINOW, supra note 32, at 110 ("[I]nstitutions represent a powerful
stockholding force."). By the end of the third quarter in 1999, institutions held 57.6% of the
stock of the top 1,000 United States companies. Id. Private pension funds were the largest
investors, with total holdings of $5064.6 billion in 1998. Following private pension funds were
investment companies ($3396.3 billion), insurance companies ($2537.4 billion), state and
local pension funds ($2334 billion), bank trusts ($1799.5 billion) and foundations and
endowments ($290.4 billion). Id.
35. See KlausJ. Hopt, Preface to INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORSAND CORPORATEGOVERNANCE
(Theodor Baums et al. eds., 1994) (claiming that the phenomenon of the institutional investor
was not relevant to corporate law until the late 1980s, as institutional investors would
"simply sell out" if not happy with a company's performance).
36. Dallas, supra note 11, at 787 & n.12; see also supra notes 14-15 and accompanying
text. For instance, not only does CalPERS maintain a set of core principles and
recommendations for corporations generally, but they also maintain an annual "Focus List"
detailing company-specific recommendations for some of the low-performing companies in
their portfolio. For example, in 2003, CalPERS requested that Gemstar-TV Guide
International, Inc. do the following:
Conduct a formal governance review using an independent external consultant.
Make a formal commitment to maintain a majority of independent directors.
Adopt CaIPERS definition of an independent director. Commit to 100%
independent directors on the Audit, Compensation, and Nominating
Committees. Adopt a formal board/self-evaluation process. Add at least one new
independent director. Develop and seek shareholder approval for a formal
executive compensation policy.
CalPERS, 2003 Focus List At-A-Glance, available at http'//www.calpers-governance.
orglalert/focus/2003/default.asp (last visited Oct. 25, 2004). Some scholars even have called
for institutional investors to play the key role in a proposal to install professional directors
as the solution to some of the current problems in corporate governance. See Ronald J. Gilson
& Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional
Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 885-87 (1991).
37. "For investors, 'poor governance is a substantial risk factor." Burns, supra note 31,
at R6 (quoting Patrick McGurn, Senior Vice President and Special Counsel of Institutional
Shareholder Services, a proxy-advisory firm).
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for companies that have "good" corporate governance.3" The share-
holder is becoming a bigger player every day in corporate gover-
nance,39 as evidenced by the cry for more independent board
members by many institutional investors. Before addressing this
latter issue, however, an explanation of the functions and duties of
the board of directors is necessary.
2. The Board of Directors
Most simply, "[bioards ... are expected to oversee management,
corporate strategy and the company's financial reports to sharehold-
ers."4" They "are a crucial part of the corporate structure"4' in that
"[t]hey are the link between the people who provide capital (the
shareholders) and the people who use that capital to create value
(the managers)."42 But just as the role of the investor has evolved
over time with respect to corporate governance, so has that of the
director. Though directors have always had the same basic, key
functions,43 the extent to which they actually perform the duties
asked of them has changed over time." To ensure that directors'
38. Id. (citing a 2002 survey completed by the consulting firm McKinsey & Co.).
39. See supra Part I.A.1.
40. Burns, supra note 31, at R6.
41. MONKS & MINOW, supra note 32, at 164.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 165, 168 (arguing that the directors of America's first corporation, led by
Alexander Hamilton, had similar responsibilities to those of modern directors).
44. This is especially true as of late. In these post-Sarbanes-Oxley times, the norms of
directorships are changing. See Russ Wiles, Boardrooms Under the Spotlight; Recent
Scandals Have Made Corporate Directorships the Hottest Seats in Town. With So Much
Scrutiny, Who Wants to Sit on a Board?, ARIZ. REP., Oct. 18, 2003, at D1. One reporter has
noted that, in the past:
[I]t often seemed corporate directors had it made. There were generous
stipends, free stock options, golf meetings, cocktail parties, a travel budget and,
sometimes, not a whole heck of a lot of work to do. But times have changed, and
directors today are breaking into a sweat, both from increased work and worry.
Id. Today's directors are having to spend more time preparing for and attending board
meetings, thus reducing the number of boards upon which they can sit. See id. In fact, many
directors are turning down offers for new directorships, for they cannot handle the others
they already have. See Andrew Countryman, Dramatic Turnover Yet to Hit Boards, CHI.
TRIB., May 25, 2003, at 1 (quoting Julie Daum of the executive search firm Spencer Stuart).
This was not always the case, however. In the past, directorships were treated "something
like the bestowal of an honorary degree." Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy
Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J.
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interests are aligned with those of the corporation-to wit, the
shareholders-the law eventually imposed duties on directors
that give them more incentive to effectively monitor management.
As a result, today, "a director owes shareholders the fiduciary
duties of due care, loyalty, candor, and obedience."45 When discuss-
ing director accountability, however, the courts and scholarship
usually speak in terms of the duties of care and loyalty;46 therefore,
these are the duties upon which this Note focuses.
With its origins in the English common law of trusts and
agency,47 the modern duty of care for directors is said to be "that
degree of care and diligence which an ordinarily prudent director
could reasonably be expected to exercise in like position under
similar circumstances."4" Seemingly an extension of the ordinary
reasonable person standard first discussed in the case Vaughan v.
Menlove,49 the duty of care standard applied to corporate directors
is more specific, as most "reasonable persons" do not know how to
judge whether, for example, a merger is in the best interests of
the corporation's shareholders.50 This standard, however, did not
develop overnight in this country. The courts first held directors of
banks and other financial institutions to a duty of good faith, which
was not as stringent as the standard applied today." It was not
until the early twentieth century that American courts universally
accepted that directors of all corporations owed a fiduciary duty of
1078, 1093 (1968) (quoting Frederick Dwight, Liability of Corporate Directors, 17 YALE L.J.
33, 33 (1907)). In 1966, one seventy-six year-old Boston banker actually sat on the boards of
forty-three corporations. Id.
45. Edward S. Adams, Corporate Governance After Enron and Global Crossing:
Comparative Lessons for Cross-National Improvement, 78 IND. L.J. 723, 731 (2003).
46. See Garry W. Jenkins, The Powerful Possibilities of Nonprofit Mergers: Supporting
Strategic Consolidation Through Law and Public Policy, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1089, 1117 n. 139.
47. Henry Ridgely Horsey, The Duty of Care Component of the Delaware Business
Judgment Rule, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 971, 973 (1994) ('By accepting of a trust of this sort
[being a corporate director], a person is obliged to execute it with fidelity and reasonable
diligence ....."(citing Charitable Corp. v. Sutton, 26 Eng. Rep. 642, 645 (Ch. 1742))).
48. DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 6.02, at 251 (1993) (internal
citation omitted).
49. 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (Ct. Com. P1. 1837). Thus, the modern definition of the duty of care
sprung from the negligence standard in tort law. See Alan R. Palmiter, Reshaping the
Corporate Fiduciary Model: A Director's Duty of Independence, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1351, 1359-60
& n.19 (1989).
50. See BRANSON, supra note 48, § 6.02, at 251-52.
51. See Horsey, supra note 47, at 973-74.
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care to shareholders that rose to the level of the prudent, reason-
able person standard.52 Today, the duty of care is codified in one
form or another in many states.53
The duty of care standard is necessary to give shareholders a
cause of action when they feel a director's misconduct, of whatever
sort, has risen to a level that necessitates litigation. Notably,
though the standard was developed long ago, for many years courts
almost never held directors liable for breach of the duty of care.54
Courts were reluctant to find such a breach because they realized
they were not business experts and felt they should defer to the
business judgment of the directors. A "creature of common law,"55
the business judgment rule was first articulated in the United
States in 1829 by a Louisiana court,56 but most of the literature
quotes a Rhode Island state court decision when referring to the
birth of the rule.57 Amidst questioning whether directors of a screw
manufacturing company would be held liable for making an ill-fated
decision to purchase stock in an iron company, the court said, "[wie
think a Board of Directors acting in good faith and with reasonable
care and diligence, who nevertheless fall into a mistake, either as
to law or fact, are not liable for the consequences of such mistake."58
Modern courts have not substantially altered this understanding of
the business judgment rule, and it is now a bedrock of corporate
law.
Most courts articulate the business judgment rule as a rebuttable
presumption that the directors acted properly, and therefore
52. Id. at 974.
53. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(a) (West 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-830(a) (2003);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-14(1) (West 2003); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717(a) (Consol. 2003).
54. In the 1960s, Professor Bishop commented, 'Itihe search for cases in which directors
of industrial corporations have been held liable in derivative suits for negligence ... is a
search for a very small number of needles in a very large haystack." Bishop, supra note 44,
at 1099. Even as late as 1984, one scholar "described the duty of care as having lead [sic] a
'twilight existence.' BRANSON, supra note 48, § 6.01, at 247 (quoting John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Litigation and Corporate Governance: An Essay on Steering Between Scylla and Charybdis,
52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 789, 796 (1984)).
55. BRANSON, supra note 48, § 7.01, at 327. Branson argues that the rule has always been
and continues to be ajudge-made rule, notwithstanding the arguments of some scholars. See
id. § 7.01, 327-28 nn.9,10.
56. See id. § 7.01, 326 n.3 (discussing Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68, 78).
57. See id. (citing Hodges v. New England Screw Co., 3 R.I. 9, 18 (1853)).
58. Hodges, 3 R.I. at 18.
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directors will not be held liable for errors in judgment, absent
extreme circumstances. Such an "[e]xpansion of the scope of the
business judgment rule has the effect of reducing the cases in
which plaintiffs may press duty of care claims with success."59 As a
result, plaintiffs often assert claims alleging that directors not only
breached their duty of care, by not acting with reasonable prudence,
but that they also breached their fundamental duty of loyalty.6 °
Under the duty of loyalty, directors must act in good faith,
keeping the shareholders' interests above their own. 1 In an
excellent recitation of the relationship between both the duty of
loyalty and the business judgment rule, one author said:
Although the duty of loyalty originally prohibited transactions
between a corporation and its directors, this prohibition
softened, and the duty evolved into an emphasis on the substan-
tive fairness of the transaction. Hence, under the duty of loyalty,
courts carefully scrutinize the transaction and are willing to
invalidate it if the transaction is perceived unfair to the corpora-
tion. Judicial deference to directors' decisions falls by the
wayside when those decisions involve a conflict of interest. If the
plaintiffs make a prima facie showing that directors have a self-
interest in a corporate transaction, the business judgment rule
becomes inapplicable. The burden shifts to the directors to
demonstrate the fairness of the transaction to the corporation.62
Not surprisingly, many plaintiffs ask where this development
leaves them or, more specifically, how they can recover against
directors who allegedly have breached their respective duties. There
was a glimmer of hope for plaintiffs pursuing breach of the duty of
care claims after the Delaware Supreme Court's 1985 landmark
decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom, where the court held that the
directors had breached their duty of care during merger negotia-
59. BRANSON, supra note 48, § 8.01, at 392.
60. See id.
61. See BRANSON, supra note 48, § 8.02, at 395; MONKS & MINOW, supra note 32, at 168
("Duty of loyalty means that a director must demonstrate unyielding loyalty to the company's
shareholders.").
62. David A. Rosenzweig, Note, Poison Pill Rights: Toward a Two-Step Analysis of
Directors'Fidelity to Their Fiduciary Duties, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 373, 376 (1988) (citations
omitted).
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tions with another company." Unfortunately for aggrieved share-
holders, the Delaware legislature reacted almost instantaneously
to the decision by passing a law that gives corporations the right to
fully indemnify directors for similar breaches of their duty of care.'
This provision, however, does not give protection to directors for
breaches of the duties of good faith and loyalty. 5 Consequently,
shareholders now must attempt to couch any alleged misconduct
as a breach of good faith or loyalty in order for their claims for
monetary damages to survive the exoneration articulated in the
statute.66
B. The Independent Director as a Corporate Governance Panacea
As one scholar recently noted, "[pirobably the most significant
trend in board governance in the United States in the last twenty
years has been the increase in the number and proportion of outside
directors on corporate boards of directors."" Led by scholars,6" the
SEC, 69 and the American Law Institute, 0 many argued that the
next step in corporate governance was to have disinterested eyes
overseeing management. 7' The theory is that a board of directors
predominantly consisting of insiders, usually high-level execu-
63. 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985).
64. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2003).
65. Id.
66. For a more detailed discussion of this development, see Lyman Johnson, After
Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse in Corporate Law, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 32 (2003)
("[Sltockholders ... understandably seek to broadly characterize director conduct as violating
the duty of loyalty or good faith, arguing for an expansive reading of these notions.").
67. Dallas, supra note 11, at 787 (citation omitted).
68. See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 170-77 (1976).
69. See Murdock, supra note 30, at 81 & nn.4-5.
70. See id.
71. The following excerpt reveals some of the history behind this new trend:
A number of high-profile corporate crimes in the 1970s prompted a fresh look
at the role of directors. The Watergate affair caused several illegal campaign
contributions to come to light. On the international front, sleazy tales emerged
of corporations bribing foreign officials to keep out competition. Observers won
dered why boards of directors, whose job it was to prevent such transgressions,
had failed in their duty.
MONKS & MINOW, supra note 32, at 191.
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tives within the firm, cannot effectively oversee themselves.
Psychological studies support this notion.72
An illustration proves helpful. Imagine a not-so-hypothetical
board7" consisting of the chief executive officer (CEO), his chief
financial officer (CFO), and several senior vice presidents of various
divisions within the company. Now, picture the CEO pushing the
limits on what might be considered acting "loyal" or "with care."
Few would argue that one of the lower-level executives would be
likely to speak up to question the CEO's intentions; besides put-
ting his directorship at stake, the executive also has his full-time
position at risk. Another scenario, however-where the board
consists of the CEO, his CFO, only one or two company executives,
and several outside directors-is more realistic in modern times.74
Assume that this is a relatively small board, with a total of seven
members. Without having a majority to "back his play," so to speak,
one of the independent directors may be hesitant to question the
powerful insiders. Therefore, it follows that as more independent
members are added to the board, without the total number of board
positions increasing, the more likely it is that the independent
director will actively manage the management.
This conclusion-that the more independent directors there are
on a board, the more likely it is that those directors will oversee
management-assumes that the independent directors are
independent in nature rather than in name only. Once the norms
of governance began to demand an independent presence on
boards, CEOs simply began to stack the board with their business
colleagues or, better yet, their personal friends.7" As Professor
72. Dallas, supra note 11, at 788 (citing James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the
Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 84-85 (1985).
73. According to one article "[in the 1960s, most [boards] had a majority of inside
directors." Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board
Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 232 (2002).
74. By 1980, only twenty boards had an outside to inside ratio of three to one or greater.
This number grew to fifty-one by 1990. MONKS & MINOW, supra note 32, at 191.
75. By definition, the shareholders elect the members of the board, but realistically, this
is not how board selection occurs. With thousands or possibly millions of different
shareholders, most exercise their vote by proxy. "A proxy is nothing more than a specialized
agency for the voting of shares. Intending to be absent, the shareholder, or proxy giver,
appoints an individual, the proxy, who will be present to act in her behalf." BRANSON, supra
note 48, § 1.05, at 14 (citations omitted). In reality, "approximately '99.65% of corporate
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Brudney said twenty years ago, "[n]o definition of independence
yet offered precludes an independent director from being a social
friend of, or a member of the same clubs, associations, or charitable
efforts as, the persons whose compensation or self-dealing transac-
tion he is asked to assess."7" While this may be true to some extent
even today, this bias can be minimized by regulating more closely
charitable donations from the corporation to the ostensible friend
of the CEO.
Notwithstanding past experience, scholars and institutional
investors still argue that independent directors are the cure-all in
corporate governance. 7 There are some scholars, though, who
profess that there is no correlation between independence and firm
performance.7" For the purposes of this Note, however, the concern
is not necessarily whether an independent director will increase
boards are elected in uncontested proxy solicitations.'" Adams, supra note 45, at 733 (quoting
Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No:A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with Barbarians Inside
the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 857, 862 (1993)).
76. Victor Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95
HARV. L. REV. 597, 613 (1982) (emphasis added).
77. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 45, at 730 ("The quest for truly independent and
qualified boards of directors will continue to achieve the ultimate goal of safeguarding the
interests of stockholders."); Elson & Gyves, supra note 7, at 869 ("Independence is a critical
element in meaningful monitoring."). One institutional investor, on its website, states that
"independence is critical to a properly functioning board." Council of Institutional Investors,
Independent Director Definition, http://www.cii.org/Policies/ind dir-defn.htm (last visited
Apr. 14, 2005).
78. See Bhagat & Black, supra note 73, at 236 ("Prior research does not support a clear
correlation between board independence and firm performance."). See generally Donald C.
Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended
Consequences of Independence and Accountablity, 89 GEO. L.J. 797 (2001). This conclusion
has also been articulated by the media. See, e.g., James Westphal, Manager's Journal: The
Impression Management Trap, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 2002, at B2. While the correlation
between director independence and firm performance is beyond the scope of this Note, it is
noteworthy that even two scholars who wrote one of the most comprehensive analyses to date
on the alleged non-correlation between independence and corporate performance admit:
[Slome directors who are classified as independent are not truly independent
of management, because they are beholden to the company or its current CEO
in ways too subtle to be captured in customary definitions of'independence.' For
example, some nominally independent directors may ... be employed by a
university or foundation that receives financial support from the company.
Unfortunately, the data needed to capture these relationships are not currently
available.
Bhagat & Black, supra note 73, at 266; see also Langevoort, supra at 799 ("If we could
identify truly independent directors more precisely, perhaps we would find the expected
correlation.").
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firm performance. Rather, the objective is to frame the context by
which the courts look into the independence of a particular director.
Both lawmakers and the SROs continue to stress director
independence. Recognizing the deficiencies associated with the
corporate accounting scandals of Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom,7 s
Sarbanes-Oxley requires that "[e] ach member of the audit commit-
tee of the issuer shall be a member of the board of directors of the
issuer, and shall otherwise be independent." ° The Act's definition
of independence leaves something to be desired, however. It
requires only that (1) the director not receive any additional fee for
serving on the audit committee, and (2) that the director not be
"affiliated""' with the corporation or one of its subsidiaries.8 2 Thus
Sarbanes-Oxley does not consider whether outside directors whose
nonprofit organizations receive charitable contributions from the
corporation are "independent."
Where Sarbanes-Oxley drops off, the SRO regulations begin. As
former NYSE chairman Richard Grasso stated in 2002, "[wle need
to root out bad practices and bad people but not presume the
system is broken." 3 With these words, the NYSE and the NASDAQ
Stock Market (NASDAQ) chose to act upon the suggestion of former
SEC chairman Harvey Pitt84 and issue new amendments to their
79. See supra notes 2-4.
80. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 775 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1). Note that "[t]he primary role of the audit committee is
oversight of the company's accounting and financial reporting process, including oversight
of the preparation of financial statements and the performance of internal and external
auditors." R. William Ide, Post-Enron Corporate Governance Opportunities: Creating a
Culture of Greater Board Collaboration and Oversight, 54 MERCER L. REV. 829, 865 (2003).
81. The authors of this legislation must have been purposefully vague as to this point.
In this single term lies the sixty-four million dollar question, what does it mean to be
"affiliated" with the company? The SEC has not yet clarified this point.
82. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 301.
83. Adam Shell, NYSE Calls for More Independence on Boards, USA TODAY, June 7,
2002, at B1 (quoting NYSE chairman Richard Grasso). Interestingly, the "bad people" to
whom Grasso was referring must have included himself. On September 17, 2003, Grasso
resigned after news of his $139.5 million deferred-compensation package became public
information. Susanne Craig et al., Taking Stock: As End Neared, Grasso Held On In Hopes
Pay Furor Would Ebb, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2003, at Al. The NYSE board of directors voted
for the acceptance of his resignation after receiving pressure from investors and politicians
alike. Id. As one article notes, "[ciritics were enraged because the NYSE appeared to be
ignoring standards it had been setting for U.S. corporations on good governance .... " Id.
84. Speaking to the NYSE and NASDAQ, in February of 2002, Pitt said, "[wie believe
that there are a number of ways that current corporate governance standards can be
216720051
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
respective listing requirements. The process was not a simple one.85
Both the NYSE and NASDAQ took months to deliberate and did
not finalize their proposals until August 2002 and October 2002,
respectively.86 It took more than one year for the SEC to approve
the collective amendments, but it finally did so on November 4,
2003, with limited changes to the last round of revisions. 7
The amendments touch on multiple aspects of governance, but
the focus is on increased director independence. For the purposes
of this Note, the overall changes in both listing requirements are
nearly identical. 8 For example, both sets of amendments require
that listed companies have a majority of independent directors.8 9
Due to the SEC's review, both also have three-year "look back"
requirements, indicating that when the board makes its determina-
tion on a particular director's independence, the evaluation only
"looks back" three years.9 ° However, the rules diverge with respect
to compensation and nomination. The NYSE demands that their
listed companies have separate, completely independent committees
in charge of setting executive compensation and nominating
directors.91 NASDAQ bestows slightly more flexibility upon its
relatively smaller companies, allowing for such matters to be
improved to strengthen the resolve of honest managers and the directors who oversee
management's actions." Press Release No. 2002-23, SEC, Pitt Seeks Review of Corporate
Governance, Conduct Codes (Feb. 13, 2002), at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-23.txt.
85. For a detailed narrative on how the NYSE and NASDAQ dealt with Chairman Pitt's
challenge, see Ide, supra note 80, at 845-54.
86. See Deborah Solomon, SEC Rules Limit Who Qualifies as 'Independent,' WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 5, 2003, at A2.
87. See Goodwin Procter LLP, Public Company Advisory: SECApproves Final NYSE and
NASDAQ Corporate Governance Standards (Nov. 11, 2003), http://www.goodwinprocter.com/
publications/PCSECApproves11_11_03.pdf. The NYSE published its first proposal in
August of 2002, but made revisions in April and then October of 2003. See New York Stock
Exchange, Amendment No. 2 to the NYSE's Corporate Governance Rule Proposals,
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/amend2-10-08-03.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2004). Likewise, on
October 9, 2003, NASDAQ filed an amendment with the SEC. See NASDAQ Stock Market,
Inc., Proposed Rule Changes, httpJ/www.NASDAQ.com/aboutfProposedRuleChanges.stm
(last visited Oct. 22, 2004).
88. In determining independence, both the NYSE and NASDAQ amendments evaluate
past employment and compensation from the company and consider family relationships.
89. See Solomon, supra note 86, at A2.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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conducted by a majority of independent members rather than
requiring separate committees.92
The most interesting facets of the new definitions of independ-
ence involve the "business relationships" (NYSE) and "business or
charitable relationships" (NASDAQ) tests that address the issue
of corporate charitable contributions presented in this Note. The
NASDAQ test is surprisingly more stringent. If a director or one
of his family members is an executive in any organization that
receives the greater of $200,000 or five percent of the organization's
annual gross revenue from the corporation, the director may not be
deemed independent.93 Further, the NASDAQ "business or charita-
ble relationships" test is not dispostive, because it maintains that
other suspect relationships should be considered despite a direc-
tor's compliance with the stated test.94 The NYSE sets a similar
benchmark but carves out an exception for charitable organizations.
Referring only to business relationships, the NYSE precludes a
director of a corporation from being considered independent if his
business receives the greater of $1 million or two percent of its
consolidated gross revenues from the corporation.95 The same test
is used for directors who are members of charitable organizations,
but it only requires disclosure in the annual proxy statement, not
disqualification.96 The specific dollar amounts and percentages of
gross income of the receiving organization are not paramount; more
important is the treatment of directors who are executives of
charitable organizations.
On the surface, NASDAQ's rule is shockingly aggressive, and
both tests certainly would limit the problem addressed in this Note.
Yet there are two reasons why neither the NASDAQ nor the NYSE
test will solve the problem surrounding charitable donations to
ostensibly independent directors' charitable organizations. First,
corporations can simply choose not to follow the rules set by their
respective SRO. Critics have questioned the effectiveness of en-
forcement policies and point out a considerable inherent conflict of
92. Id.
93. See Goodwin Procter LLP, supra note 87.
94. See id. at 3-4.
95. See id. at 4.
96. See id.
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interests.97 If an NYSE corporation, for example, makes a large
charitable contribution to one of its director's organization, it
could simply decide not to disclose the donation. The way in which
the NYSE would penalize the company would be to delist it from
the exchange.98 The problem is obvious: not only would such a
drastic measure prove embarrassing for the SRO, but it also would
decrease its own revenue.99 To be sure, we will not likely begin
seeing the SROs delisting companies for such infractions. 1°'
Second, besides the lack of an effective enforcement scheme, a
savvy CEO can easily side-step the new regulations, thus perpetu-
ating the problem at hand. The NYSE's and NASDAQ's relationship
rules look only to a given year in isolation, even with the three-year
"look back" provision. Therefore, a director of an NYSE-listed
company could be under the influence of an executive of the
corporation who gives his charitable organization, for example,
$750,000 per year every single year. Assuming that this donation
does not violate the percentage facet of the rule, such a significant
stream of contributions also would not breach the threshold set in
the rules. Without considering such contributions in the aggregate,
the NYSE and NASDAQ rules have little chance of identifying and
impeding "independent" directors' conflicts of interest.
97. See, e.g., Karessa Cain, Note, New Efforts to Strengthen Corporate Governance: Why
Use SRO Listing Standards?, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 619, 649-53; see also Roberta S.
Karmel, The Future of Corporate Governance Listing Requirements, 54 SMU L. REV. 325,356
(2001) (questioning whether SROs will be able to enforce effectively their listing standards
as competitors enter the market).
98. The NYSE and Amex (American Stock Exchange) have, however, proposed another
method of enforcement: the issuance of public reprimand letters. See Cain, supra note 97, at
650. Such a humiliation tactic seems to lack any substance, and likely will not prove very
effective. All of this is assuming, of course, that the NYSE would spot the transgression. With
about 2,800 companies listed on the exchange, it certainly is possible that this is a faulty
assumption.
99. Id.
100. One student author has noted that "only fifteen of the 2,300 delistings recorded by
NASDAQ from 1999 to 2001 were for corporate governance violations, and the NYSE has not
initiated any delistings on such grounds in recent years." Id.
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C. Why the Courts Care About Whether a Director Is Independent:
Shareholder Derivative Suits
The laws, regulations, and policy recommendations discussed
above are proactive measures designed to influence corporate
governance. The hope is that these changing definitions of inde-
pendence, along with new methods of implementation, will force
directors to be more diligent in carrying out their duties and to act
with the utmost loyalty with respect to shareholders. There will
always be transgressors, however, and the law permits any share-
holder to bring a lawsuit to enforce their rights.
There are two forms of shareholder lawsuits. The direct lawsuit
involves injury to the shareholder individually and most often
involves a denial of voting rights or dilution of ownership.'' Most
shareholder suits, however, and the ones with which this Note is
concerned, are derivative in nature. Derivative suits evolved,
because "[tihe common law provided no means whereby corporate
managers could be called to account. The derivative action was thus
born in the nineteenth century as an equitable remedy to fill the
gap in the common law." 02 The difference between the two types of
suits is not always obvious, but the key aspect of the derivative suit
is that the shareholder is suing on behalf of the corporation, or
stepping into the corporation's shoes, so to speak. For instance, a
lawsuit brought by a shareholder alleging breach of the directors'
duties will always be a derivative suit. A shareholder has a right to
bring a derivative suit, and the law has developed procedures so
that the system can accommodate the scores of derivative suits
brought each year.
It is important to note that the focus of this discussion of
shareholder suits will be on Delaware corporate law. The reasons
for this are twofold. First, Delaware law drives corporate law, as
most large corporations are incorporated there.' 3 Plaintiffs often
101. See BRANSON, supra note 48, § 11.07; see, e.g., Eisenberg v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc.,
451 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1971) (holding that a shareholder's claim of deprivation of a voting right
was rightly a direct suit); Lochheed v. Alacano, 697 F. Supp. 406,412 (D. Utah 1988) (holding
that a shareholder's claim of dilution of the value of shares was rightly a direct suit);
Reifsnyder v. Pittsburgh Outdoor Adver. Co., 173 A.2d 319, 322 (Pa. 1961) (holding that
dilution of shareholders' voting power could be challenged in a direct suit).
102. BRANSON, supra note 48, § 11.03, at 595.
103. See supra note 21.
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bring suit in Delaware, because the state has unique statutory
devices for gaining personal jurisdiction over all of the likely
corporate executive defendants. 104 The second reason is that both of
the principal cases that this Note analyzes are Delaware cases.1°5
To perpetuate Delaware's corporate-friendly status, the legisla-
ture has created a high hurdle for shareholders to clear in their
efforts to have the Chancery Court hear their case on the merits.
Chancery Court Rule 23.1 requires a shareholder first to take their
issue to the board by making a pre-litigation demand, before they
can file a derivative action with the courts.' 6 The court does not
regard this demand requirement as a procedural rule but rather as
a substantive one, which is strictly enforced in Delaware. 107 As a
result of this demand requirement, shareholders only have "the
right to bring a derivative action under two circumstances: (1)
where demand on the board of directors was made and wrongfully
refused, and (2) where the plaintiff can establish that demand
would have been futile had such a demand been made."' Given
that shareholders almost never succeed when proceeding under the
first option,10 9 most plaintiffs choose to allege that demand would
have been futile.
The law of demand futility is governed by the court's decision in
Aronson v. Lewis."' As articulated in Aronson, the test has two
104. Delaware law states that:
Every nonresident of this State who ... accepts election or appointment as a
director, trustee or member of the governing body of a corporation organized
under the laws of this State ... shall, by such acceptance or by such service, be
deemed thereby to have consented to the appointment of the registered agent
of such corporation (or, if there is none, the Secretary of State) as an agent upon
whom service of process may be made in all civil actions or proceedings brought
in this State, by or on behalf of, or against such corporation ....
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114 (1974). Since its passage, the Delaware Supreme Court has
held the statute constitutional. See Armstrong v. Pomerance, 423 A.2d 174, 176 (1980).
105. See infra Part II.
106. See DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1.
107. Elizabeth A. Wilburn, Recent Developments in Delaware Corporate Law, Beyond
Aronson: Recent Delaware Cases on Demand Futility, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 535, 537 (1995).
108. Id. at 537-38.
109. In Delaware, under demand-refused cases, the plaintiff gets only limited discovery,
which makes it invariably difficult to meet the pleading requirements. See Harry G.
Hutchison, Presumptive Business Judgment, Substantive Good Faith, Litigation Control:
Vindicating the Socioeconomic Meaning of Harhen v. Brown, 26 J. CORP. L. 285, 313-14
(2001).
110. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
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prongs. First, the court questions "the independence and disinter-
estedness of the directors.""' The court conducts this inquiry
through the lens of the business judgment rule, however, which
means that director independence will be presumed." 2 Second, the
court inquires into whether the board exercised valid business
judgment with respect to the challenged transaction."' As dis-
cussed above, the court rarely will conclude that the directors did
not exercise sound business judgment;"4 so, to meet the demand
futility test, plaintiffs usually allege in one form or another that the
directors are not independent. As a result, before reaching the
merits of the case, the court usually questions the independence of
the board, director-by-director, on a purely subjective basis."'
Clearly, the courts must pay careful attention to the definition of
director independence, as it becomes the threshold issue for
plaintiffs striving to have the merits of their cases heard by the
court.
Long after the rules surrounding the demand requirement
became commonplace in corporate law, corporations found yet an-
other method to thwart shareholders' derivative claims. Conceived
in the 1970s," 6 the special litigation committee ("SLC") spells
disaster for derivative plaintiffs. Even if a plaintiff has a good case
for demand futility, Delaware corporations are authorized by
statute to create a committee to inquire into whether the litigation
is in the best interest of the corporation."' The case that governs
the substantive law surrounding SLCs in Delaware, Zapata Corp.
v. Maldonado,"' is illustrative of plaintiffs' likely success in proving
derivatives when the board has created an SLC.
In Zapata, a shareholder brought a derivative action against the
directors of the corporation for breaches of their fiduciary duties,
and alleged that demand was futile, as all of the directors were
111. Id. at 814.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 55-66.
115. See, e.g., Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5,26-32 (Del. Ch. 2002); In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 356-61 (Del. Ch. 1998).
116. See Murdock, supra note 30, at 88.
117. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a), (c)(2) (1974).
118. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
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"interested" parties." 9 At this point, the directors could have taken
their chances under the law of Aronson. Zapata's attorneys surely
advised against this route, under the assumption that the corpora-
tion's board would not have passed judicial scrutiny as "independ-
ent." Instead, the corporation expunged several directors-surely
the most culpable ones-and added two new directors to create an
"independent" SLC to determine whether the derivative suit was in
the best interest of the corporation. 2 ° Ultimately, the corporation
was hoping to purge the board of its alleged wrongdoers and add
newfound credence to its decision to terminate the litigation.
After deciding that a corporation does have the power to form an
SLC notwithstanding the absence of a demand,' 2 ' the Delaware
Supreme Court laid out the test that is now followed by courts
dealing with SLC issues. Not unlike the Aronson test for demand
futility, the Zapata test has two parts. First, the corporation must
bear the burden of proving the independence and good faith of the
committee and must show that their inquiry was a reasonable
one. "'22 Here, the court stressed that independence is crucial and
will not be presumed.123 Second, the court may use its own business
judgment to determine whether the SLC correctly ended the
litigation,"' an analysis that is typically deferential to the decisions
of board directors.'25 The end result is that the independence of the
newly appointed members of the SLC becomes the only "Achilles'
heel" at which plaintiffs can take aim. Consequently, unless courts
are willing to discount the importance of derivative suits in
corporate law, courts must pay more attention to the implications
of defining director independence for derivative suit litigation.
119. Id. at 780.
120. Id. at 781.
121. Id. at 785-88.
122. Id. at 788.
123. Id. at 788-89.
124. Id. at 789.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
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II. A CRITICAL LOOK AT Two RECENT CASES: DISNEY AND ORACLE
A. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation
126
The facts of Disney are well-known. The story began in 1995
when Disney CEO Michael Eisner hired his friend of twenty-five
years, Michael Ovitz, as Disney's president. 127 Ovitz had gained
experience in the entertainment industry through his talent agency
but had never served as an executive for a large, publicly held
company."' Ovitz's lack of pertinent experience was of no conse-
quence to Eisner, though, as he unilaterally hired Ovitz. 129 The rest
is history; after only fourteen months on the job, Ovitz admitted
knowing "about [one] percent of what I need to know" and began
searching for a new position. 3 ° Eventually, Eisner and Ovitz agreed
that Ovitz should resign but not before collecting on his now
infamous employment contract. After all was said and done, Ovitz
walked away with a gargantuan severance package valued at $140
million.'3 ' Plaintiffs then filed a derivative suit alleging four
different claims, the most salient being that the directors had
"breached their fiduciary duties of loyalty, good faith, and due care"
in connection with both entering into the contract with Ovitz and
in failing to handle appropriately his resignation.3 2
Notwithstanding the court's acknowledgment that the severance
package was "perhaps larger than any ever paid,"'33 it refused to be
swayed by the shocking nature of the facts and quickly turned to
the Aronson test concerning the demand requirement. In address-
ing the first prong of Aronson, the court stated:
In order to prove domination and control by Eisner, Plaintiffs
must demonstrate first that Eisner was personally interested in
obtaining the Board's approval of the Employment Agreement
... and, second, that a majority of the Board could not exercise
126. 731 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 1998).
127. John Gibeaut, Stock Responses, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2003, at 38.
128. Id. at 41.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 42.
131. Id. at 38.
132. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 353 (Del. Ch. 1998).
133. Id. at 350.
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business judgment independent of Eisner in deciding whether
to approve the Employment Agreement.'"
After concluding that the plaintiffs had not met their burden with
respect to Eisner's alleged personal interest,135 the court proceeded
to consider whether each director was sufficiently independent of
Eisner.13
Most important for the purposes of this Note is the way in
which the court dealt with director Father Leo J. O'Donovan of
Georgetown University. The court immediately acknowledged that
"O'Donovan is the president of Georgetown University, the alma
mater of one of Eisner's sons and the recipient of over $1 million of
donations from Eisner since 1989."' 37 The court seemed to take
these facts into consideration, but it then distinguished this
purported "independent" relationship from similar relationships in
two cases that resulted in decisions favorable to the respective
plaintiffs. 131
First, the court stated that "[tihe closest parallel to O'Donovan's
situation faced by this Court occurred in Lewis v. Fuqua."'39 In that
case, the alleged disinterested director, Sanford, was the president
of Duke University, which had received millions of dollars from the
dominant board member, Fuqua. 4 ° The Disney court quickly
distinguished that relationship from the one before the court,
concluding that "Lewis does not apply,""" because Fuqua and
Sanford had sat on other boards together and were involved
politically and financially, whereas such an interlocking relation-
134. Id. at 355.
135. Id. at 356. Notably, the case then went up to the Delaware Supreme Court, which
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded back to the Chancery Court. See Brehm v.
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). Then, most recently, the Chancery Court viewed the
plaintiffs' amended complaint and concluded that it sufficiently pleaded a breach of the
directors' fiduciary duty so as to withstand a motion to dismiss. See In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 278 (Del. Ch. 2003). Thus, after seven years of litigation, the
plaintiffs finally will have the merits of their case heard by the court.
136. Disney, 731 A.2d at 356-62.
137. Id. at 359.
138. Id.
139. Id. (discussing Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962 (Del. Ch. 1985)).
140. Lewis, 502 A.2d at 965, 967. Interestingly, Duke's business school is named 'The
Fuqua School of Business."
141. Disney, 731 A.2d at 359.
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ship was not alleged to exist between O'Donovan and Eisner. 142 The
court's hasty distinction is assailable on several grounds. First, the
Disney court's inquiry is more narrow than that of the Lewis court.
In his opinion in Lewis, Vice Chancellor Hartnett listed the facts
that called Sanford's independence into question, before stating
that "[tihese potential conflicts of interest or divided loyalties, when
considered as a whole, raise a question of fact as to whether Terry
Sanford could act independently."' Although there were additional
facts linking Fuqua and Sanford, the Lewis court did not stress any
one set of facts over another. Arguably, the core set of facts between
the two cases are the same. In each case, a dominant board member
gave substantial donations to the alleged disinterested outside
director's organization.
Further, stressing that Eisner had no formal relationship with
Georgetown, the Disney court missed the forest for the trees. The
Lewis court expressed two related points that the Disney court
failed to consider: (1) that true independence of board members is
crucial to sustaining the validity of derivative suits, and (2) that the
burden is on the moving party to show independence.'" The
explanation for the Disney court's departure from Lewis's point is
clear: it deemed that O'Donovan's status as a Jesuit priest made
him "like Caesar's wife ... above reproach." 4 ' Presumptions as to
the character of a director simply have no place in a court's
determination of independence. The plaintiffs alleged enough
information for the court to accept that large donations had been
made to O'Donovan's organization and this should have been the
end of the inquiry.
The next step in the analysis, according to the Disney court, was
to consider "whether Eisner exerted such an influence on
O'Donovan that O'Donovan could not exercise independent
judgment as a director."'46 In this inquiry, the court again
stressed O'Donovan's status as a Jesuit priest, noting that he did
142. Id.
143. Lewis, 502 A.2d at 967 (emphasis added).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Disney, 731 A.2d at 359.
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not even collect a director's fee for his services. 4 v The plaintiffs
analogized O'Donovan's reward, "'Eisner's philanthropic largess to
Georgetown,""48 to that of the three SLC members in the Chancery
Court's unpublished decision in Kahn v. Tremont Corp.149 Not
surprisingly, the court held that "[tihe distinction between Kahn
and this matter ... is clear," 5 ° simply because the directors in Kahn
received a personal financial benefit whereas O'Donovan did not.'5 '
However, the court's distinction is contradicted by a more recent
decision with remarkably similar facts.52 In the case of In re
Limited, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, the alleged disinterested
director was the former president of The Ohio State Univer-
sity-the dominating director's alma mater-and the university had
received millions of dollars in donations from the corporation during
the director's presidential tenure.' In its discussion, the court said
that "[wihile the gift was not to [the alleged independent director]
personally, it was a positive reflection on him and his fundraising
efforts as university president to have successfully solicited such a
gift."'54 Granted, the gift in this case was larger than Eisner's gift
to Georgetown, but the court's logic in Limited cannot be ignored.
As to the Disney court's acknowledgment of O'Donovan's pur-
ported ambivalence towards the reward, the only valid conclusion
to be drawn from the court's reasoning is that O'Donovan served on
Disney's board out of the kindness of his heart. Without being
overly pessimistic, one can safely say that this is not a logical
assertion. Few individuals, if any, take on such a significant
responsibility without any expectation of reward. Ironically, this
reality actually bolsters the argument that O'Donovan's presence
on Disney's board was on a quid pro quo basis: a board seat for
continued generous donations.
147. See id. (differentiating between O'Donovan's situation and the personal financial
benefits involved in Kahn v. Tremont Corp., No. 12339, 1994 WL 162613 (Del. Ch. Apr. 21,
1994)).
148. Id. (citing Pls.' Br. Opp'n to Defs.' Mots. to Dismiss at 30).
149. See id. (discussing Kahn, No. 12339, 1994 WL 162613).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See In re Limited, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. CIV.A. 17148-NC, 2002 WL 537692 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 27, 2002).
153. See id. at *6.
154. Id. at *7.
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B. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litigation 5
In contrast to Disney, the court in Oracle correctly determined
that the directors at issue were not sufficiently independent of the
dominating board member. There are problems, however, with the
court's mode of analysis. The court should have ended its inquiry
after discovering only the tip of the iceberg, to wit, the well
established philanthropic relationship between Oracle, its directors,
and the academic institution at which the SLC members work.
Instead, the opinion spans twenty-eight pages. This Note's criticism
of the court's decision aims not only to encourage judicial economy,
but also to make sure that courts in future decisions do not stray
from the crux of the matter by delving into an unnecessary analysis
of directors' personal relationships.
In Oracle, the shareholders brought a derivative action against
specific directors, including Oracle's famed CEO, Larry Ellison,
alleging various insider trading infractions. 5 6 Following the now-
standard procedure, 15 7 the corporation organized an SLC to
investigate the insider trading charges.'58 The corporation chose to
enlist the aid of two revered Stanford University professors, Hector
Garcia-Molina of the computer science department and Joseph
Grundfest of the law school, to serve on the SLC.5 9 The average
outsider might deem such a choice a fair one that was congruent
with the spirit of SLC law, which requires proof of independent
judgment. This was not the case, however. Relatively early in his
opinion, Vice Chancellor Strine acknowledged, among other things,
that the SLC report specifically omitted material ties between the
board and the members of the SLC, which he regarded "with some
shock."16' At this point, the court went to great pains to distinguish
the Stanford professors from those called into question in the
previously discussed cases. There existed an admitted "multitude
of ties" between the professors and the board members, but the
155. 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003).
156. Id. at 921.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 116-25.
158. Oracle, 824 A.2d at 923. It almost goes without saying that the two-person SLC voted
to terminate the derivative action. Id. at 928.
159. Id. at 923-24.
160. Id. at 929.
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court emphasized that the professors' duties at Stanford did not
include fundraising.' 6 ' Finally, the court went through all of the
named defendants and fully examined the ties each had to Stanford
and/or the SLC members.
162
By no means should a director's status as a fundraiser or non-
fundraiser be diminished with respect to the independence inquiry,
but in this case the overwhelming nature of the facts made this
point moot. Two of Oracle's directors, Lucas and Ellison, had given
tens of millions of dollars to Stanford in the past. 6 3 Another
director, Boskin, was also a tenured professor at Stanford and was
the former mentor of Grundfest, an SLC member. 64 As if these
facts, undisclosed in the SLC report,165 were not enough to end
the inquiry summarily, during this period Ellison was planning
to donate $150 million to either Stanford, Harvard, or the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology to create an interdisciplin-
ary economics-technology program. 66 The sheer size of this
potential donation should have blinded the court to anything other
than the fact that both SLC members were professors at Stanford
with much to gain-or lose-from their relationship with Ellison.
Renowned in their respective disciplines or not, neither Grundfest
nor Garcia-Molina wanted to do anything that might have hindered
Stanford's opportunity to capture this significant endowment. Any
court that might conclude otherwise is simply ignoring reality.
Ultimately, the court properly dismissed the corporation's motion
to terminate the derivative suit. The problem with the decision,
however, becomes clear late in the opinion, when the court stated:
Given that general context, Ellison's relationship to Stanford
itself contributes to my overall doubt, when heaped on top of the
ties involving Boskin and Lucas. During the period when
Grundfest and Garica-Molina were being added to the Oracle
board, Ellison was publicly considering making extremely large
contributions to Stanford. Although the SLC denies knowledge
of these public statements, Grundfest claims to have done a fair
161. See id. at 930.
162. See id. at 930-36.
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. See id. at 929.
166. See id. at 932-34.
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amount of research before joining the board, giving me doubt
that he was not somewhat aware of the possibility that Ellison
might bestow large blessings on Stanford.167
There was no need for the court to summarize the many ties
between the board and SLC members. The court had enough
ammunition to safely find that the directors were non-independent
without seemingly creating, whether intentionally or not, a test for
"independence" based on the convoluted ties between three different
directors and the corporation itself. In its defense, the court was
moving the law into previously uncharted territory, which may
explain the overly exhaustive and detailed nature of the opinion.
Indeed, as one expert commented, "[t]he decision by [Chancellor]
Strine represents one of the most far-reaching ever on corporate
governance by the influential Delaware Chancery Court because it
tightens the definition of director independence to cover philan-
thropic ties."6 ' Regardless, the law of corporate governance remains
in need of a more distinct test for defining director independence in
order to ensure systematic adherence to the underlying purpose of
providing shareholders with a genuine opportunity to have the
merits of a claim adjudicated.
III. How To ADDRESS THIS GROWING PROBLEM
A. The Need for Concern
Although this Note has shown that there is sufficient cause for
concern with respect to the Delaware Chancery Court's treatment
of nonprofit leaders sitting on corporate boards, the magnitude of
this issue still remains in limbo if there is not a significant number
of such directors in existence. Yet, as it turns out, there are indeed
enough members of this distinct class of directors to warrant
increased attention. 169
167. Id. at 945-46.
168. Kara Scannell & Joann S. Lublin, Judge Rules Special Oracle Panel Had Conflicts
of Interest, WALL ST. J., June 17, 2003, at C14 (quoting Charles Elson).
169. See infra app.
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The author of this Note conducted a limited empirical study using
a sample consisting of sixty-eight Fortune 500 companies.17 0 The
survey covers those corporations that Fortune ranked numbers one
through twenty, respectively, and then every tenth firm in the list
of the remaining four-hundred-eighty companies. For each corpora-
tion examined, the following data were recorded: 1) total number of
directors; 2) number of inside directors; 3) number of outside
directors; and 4) number of target directors. 17 1 Overall, the average
number of directors for the firms examined was 11.69. Company
insiders represented only about 18% of this total, whereas outsiders
and target members collectively comprised 82% of board member-
ship. Target board members composed about 10% of overall board
membership. These numbers, of course, do not prove a trend but
demonstrate that nonprofit leaders have a significant presence on
corporate boards. 172 These figures also lend support to this Note's
call for increased attention to the way in which a director's
independence is defined. Furthermore, corporations are continually
seeking increased board independence, 173 and therefore, the number
of nonprofit leaders sitting on public corporate boards should only
increase in the future.
174
170. See The Fortune 500, FORTUNE, Apr. 14, 2003, at F-1, F-19.
171. For the purposes of this examination, the definitions are as follows. Any current or
former company officer (e.g., chief executive officer, vice president, etc.) is deemed an
"insider." The "target members" are those leaders of nonprofit organizations who are the
focus of this Note. Finally, all others not affiliated with the corporation in any respect are
considered "outsiders." This final group is dominated by executives from other large
corporations but also includes many attorneys.
Although the data are reliable and serve as the empirical ground upon which this Note
rests, the investigation was limited by the lack of readily available information on a
particular director's status. Most of the information gathered to determine each director's
status came from 19 CORPORATE YELLOW BOOK (Fall 2003). Given that some corporations
were not included in this compilation, some data were recovered from corporate websites,
Lexis/Nexis, and corporate public filings.
172. Initially, the goal of this study was to identify specific target members and to
investigate whether the corporation makes significant donations to the respective director's
nonprofit organization. Such a task, however, is immensely difficult to accomplish, as this
sort of information is extremely hard to find. As such, this type of inquiry is beyond the
bounds of this Note.
173. See supra Part I.B; see also Adams, supra note 45, at 730.
174. See Bank & Lublin, supra note 18, at Al.
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B. Bright-line Rules/ Two Possible Solutions
There are two possible solutions that would simplify the problem
of identifying which directors are independent. Each has the benefit
of ease of administration; the courts would have little trouble
applying the rules to achieve the desired result of making sure that
independent directors are true to their label.
First, the courts could simply disqualify, as not independent, any
director who is an executive of a charitable organization, regardless
of any alleged donations being made to that organization. However,
such a broad, sweeping rule would greatly decrease the pool of truly
independent director candidates. The corporations would then have
to rely on other "outside directors" who may not be as disconnected
from the corporate world.'75 To be sure, executives from museums,
university presidents, academics, and the like bring significant
talents and independence to their respective boards. Further, not
every corporation with such independent directors makes contribu-
tions to the directors' organizations, and such a bright-line rule
would ultimately punish many for the questionable actions of a few.
Such a judicial test would place a large hurdle in the way of
corporations attempting to comply with the recent trend towards
more accountable corporate governance. Accordingly, this test is not
desirable or feasible.
Less stringent than the first proposed test, the courts instead
could disallow charitable contributions to the target directors'
organizations.'76 What some might characterize as legislating
from the bench,'77 this prohibition would require corporations to
characterize directors as not independent when donations are made
to their respective organizations. In effect, corporations would have
to stop donating to some of their favorite charities; otherwise, the
legal benefits of having such well respected, independent directors
175. See supra text accompanying notes 74-75.
176. Jayne Barnard has suggested a similar rule to control "opportunistic corporate
giving" through legislative means. See Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Philanthropy,
Executives' Pet Charities and the Agency Problem, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1147 (1997).
177. Of course, this type ofjudicial activism is likely to stir some emotions, but others still
argue that state judges can and should continue to shape the law from the bench. See
Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 424
(2003). Furthermore, a judicial approach bypasses the insurmountable obstacles that
accompany legislative prohibitions. See Barnard, supra note 176, at 1169.
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could not be realized. There are several benefits to this solution.
Like the first proposal, this approach certainly appears to be
relatively easy to administer. The courts simply would look to the
plaintiffs' limited discovery efforts-thus relying on the plaintiffs to
do their own "homework" and point out such conflicts of interest to
the court-and identify any donations that the corporation has
made to the director's charitable organization during the preceding
five years. Once such donations are identified, the court would
proceed no further in its investigation and would conclude that the
director is not independent.
Unfortunately, a complex web of fundamental and systematic
problems hinders the effectiveness of this proposal. First, it surely
is easier said than done for plaintiffs to uncover much information
on charitable contributions during the pre-litigation stage of a
derivative suit,17 8 as cases like Oracle, in which the plaintiffs un-
covered an amazing amount of useable information, are aberrations.
The plaintiffs in Oracle were more fortunate than most in that
many of the ties for which they were looking were available to the
public at large; this certainly is not true for most corporate
charitable contributions. Unless a corporation donates through its
own charitable foundation, no law requires it to disclose any of its
charitable contributions.'79 One scholar has noted that "the gener-
ally confidential nature of corporate philanthropy, combined with
the fact that politicized donations are especially likely to be kept
confidential from corporate shareholders (and other members of the
public), means that it is very difficult to unearth examples of ...
noncommercial charitable contributions."8 ° This scholar, and
others,' argue that amending federal regulations to require dis-
closure of charitable contributions would greatly benefit corporate
governance. It would also help the shareholder overcome his
present task of finding the needle in the haystack. Such a change
178. See supra note 109.
179. See Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora's Box: Managerial Discretion and the Problem
of Corporate Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L. REV. 579, 581-88 (1997).
180. Id. at 613.
181. See, e.g., Barnard, supra note 176, at 1169 (agreeing with Professor Kahn's proposal);
Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Transparency,
112 HARv. L. REV. 1197, 1201 & n.13 (1999) (citing Kahn and others in support of her
argument that the SEC can and should require corporations to disclose their charitable
contributions as one way in which to create a "social transparency").
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is not likely,1 2 however, and shareholders must continue to use the
limited "tools at hand."8 3
Assuming that a plaintiff somehow manages to gather enough
facts to establish a lack of independence, a sweeping per se rule
that bars charitable contributions to target directors' organizations
may still have other problems. For instance, as Professor Barnard
notes, many truly philanthropic donations may not be made as a
result of such a rule, and society as a whole may suffer.' Obvi-
ously, this is not a desired result. However, this proposal does not
preclude the corporation from donating to other charitable organiza-
tions. If philanthropy is truly the reason for the donation, then this
test should cause no problem, for there are certainly thousands of
other charities that need assistance.8 5 If influence is the goal, then
this rule would put a stop to it. Nevertheless, the practical difficulty
of a plaintiff proving a lack of independence outweighs the potential
benefits of such a test, and a less precise test will have to suffice.
C. The Functional Approach
To alleviate the problem alluded to in the discussion of Oracle,' 6
courts must utilize a less-inclusive test of independence. With the
simplification of a process, one must be willing to trade some
exactness for efficiency though it is noteworthy that the way in
which courts examine each director using a subjective standard,
rather than an objective standard is not purported to be an exact
test anyway. 8 7 A more proactive court in this area could then
devote its time and resources to the more substantive portions of a
case.
182. Congress has not considered the issue since 1999. See H.R. 887, 106th Cong. (1999).
183. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 279 (Del. Ch. 2003)
(noting how the plaintiffs made use of DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220).
184. See Barnard, supra note 176, at 1168.
185. The Oracle court made an analogous point in defending its holding on policy grounds.
The defendants in that case argued that the court's holding would "chill the ability of
corporations to locate qualified independent directors in the academy." In re Oracle Corp.
Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 947 (Del. Ch. 2003). The court responded that such a
statement was ludicrous given that "[i]fthere are 1,700 professors at Stanford alone, as the
SLC says, how many must there be on the west coast of the United States, at institutions
without ties to Oracle ...?" Id.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 166-68.
187. See Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 24 (Del. Ch. 2002).
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First, it is imperative that the courts not be influenced by the
ostensible untarnished character of a director. A quintessential
example of such a mistake was highlighted in an earlier Part with
respect to the Disney court's treatment of Father O'Donovan. 8'
Regardless of how impeccable one's reputation might seem, the
court cannot ever peer into the soul of an individual. Admittedly,
this is counterintuitive in that the reason for the presence of this
director is to appear untouchable and to bring a sense of morality
to the board which is allegedly deficient in this respect. The director
serves a practical role in serving on certain committees that require
independent directors. On the other hand, the independent director
also serves as an attractive asset to investors looking for a company
that values strong governance." 9 Thus, the figurehead nature of the
director is not eliminated altogether but only in the eyes of courts.
The next step requires a realization that this problem of
director independence can be viewed on a spectrum. At one end of
the spectrum, there exists a director whose organization receives
relatively small charitable donations and who also has no central
role in the donor-donee relationship. On the opposite end, there
exists the director who heads the fundraising for his organization
and who sits on the board as a quid pro quo for large donations.
There should be some per se rules to quickly disqualify the latter
director from being treated as independent. Conversely, as to the
former, the court should use pre-determined factors to quickly deem
him independent.
Further, there must be some sort of moderate bright-line rule as
to the raw dollar amounts being donated. A modified version of the
NASDAQ test 9 ° will best serve courts. As previously mentioned,
the NASDAQ and NYSE tests look only to one given year and
therefore miss the "big picture." 1 ' A more realistic plan would
involve a broader view-one that examines donations as a whole or
as a stream of cash flows. After all, receiving a relatively modest
donation every year for a number of years could represent an
188. See supra Part II.A.
189. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 83-96. The NASDAQ test includes charitable
relationships in its inquiry, whereas the NYSE test looks only to business relationships. See
supra text accompanying notes 93-96.
191. See supra Part I.B.
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integral facet of a particular charity's expected revenues. This
contribution could prove more influential than a larger, lump sum
payment and, therefore, must be taken into account.
There exists one last consideration before these proffered modes
of evaluation can be applied. As noted above, charitable donations
are invariably difficult to uncover,'92 and courts need to adapt
accordingly. Once the court acknowledges that a director is suspect,
it should assume that the corporation is donating to the charitable
organization for which he works. 9 ' The result is a rebuttable
presumption against the independence of the target director. This
is not a drastic change from the court's current role in an SLC
inquiry. In Oracle, Vice Chancellor Strine said that "the SLC bears
the burden of proving its independence. It must convince me."'94
This Note's proposed extension of the burden of proof articulated in
Oracle would make that task only slightly more difficult'95 and
should alleviate the problem associated with the non-disclosure of
charitable donations.'96 Now, given that the court presumes the
worst case scenario, the defendants will be forced to provide
documentary evidence of their historical and prospective charitable
activity and to explain how such donations do not affect the accused
director.
192. See supra notes 178-83 and accompanying text.
193. As it turns out, this is a safe assumption to make. See Bank & Lublin, supra note 18;
Kahn, supra note 179, at 613.
194. In re Oracle Corp. Derivatvie Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 937 (Del. Ch. 2003).
195. That is, of course, if the director is truly independent. If he is not, the task should
necessarily be an onerous one.
196. See text accompanying notes 178-80. Of course, the shareholders are not "fishing in
the dark." Delaware does have a statute that gives shareholders access to some internal
corporate documents. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (2001). This statute, however, is not
likely to help a plaintiff searching for information concerning the corporation's charitable
contributions, because the Chancery Court scrutinizes shareholder requests to ensure that
the statute's scope is a narrow one. See, e.g., Helnsman Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. A & S
Consultants, Inc., 525 A.2d 160, 165-66 (Del. Ch. 1987) ("A mere statement of a purpose to
investigate possible general mismanagement, without more, will not entitle a shareholder
to broad § 220 inspection relief. There must be some evidence of possible mismanagement
as would warrant further investigation of the matter."). Even if one were to assume away
this reality, the above suggested proposal would alleviate the time and cost issues associated
with the utilization of this statute. See Randall S. Thomas, Improving Shareholder
Monitoring of Corporate Management by Expanding Statutory Access to Information, 38 ARIZ.
L. REv. 331, 360 (1996) (discussing the deficiencies of section 220).
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Once the corporation has provided the court with the relevant
information,'97 the court must turn to the individual director. The
directors who are also university presidents, private foundation
CEOs, and other leaders who engage in fundraising as one of their
primary job functions are most likely to have questionable inde-
pendence. For this reason, the court should perform only a quanti-
tative analysis with respect to these individuals, and only a bright-
line test will suffice. Because the goal of this test is to preclude
over-influence of individuals who are supposed to serve as unbiased
corporate overseers and not to stop donations altogether, corporate
charitable contributions are not problematic so long as the dona-
tions do not "amount" to influence. Finding an exact number at
which to draw the line, however, can be problematic. The SRO
guidelines provide an excellent starting place. 9 ' To allow for some
relatively trivial charity to exist, the courts should consider any
donations under $100,000 in any fiscal year as not raising concerns
about compromised integrity.'99 Ultimately, then, the court should
disqualify a director if more than $100,000 was donated to the
director's organization. Just as the SROs take into consideration
the size of the director's organization, so must the courts. The
director should not be deemed independent if the donation is
greater than two percent (the NYSE's limit) of his entity's gross
revenue. Finally, the court must consider the overall picture. If
more than $250,000 was donated during any five-year interval,
including any prospective pledges, then the court should deem the
director not independent. °°
The more difficult determination involves those directors, usually
university professors, who do not participate in fundraising as part
of their core job description. Unless the dollar amount of the
197. One can assume that the corporation will be forthright with the court so that its civil
suit does not turn into a criminal one.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 83-96.
199. Note that this is half of the amount dictated by the NASDAQ rule. See supra text
accompanying note 93.
200. Admittedly, this is somewhat of an arbitrary distinction. More extensive empirical
research into the size of corporate charitable contributions would prove helpful; however,
such an investigation is beyond the bounds of this Note. On the other hand, bright line rules
must always bear some level of arbitrariness. The point here is to employ a more exacting
test than those of NASDAQ and the NYSE.
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corporation's charitable donation is shockingly large,2 °' the court
should not write off these directors as beholden to management.
Instead, for these individuals, a more extensive analysis is neces-
sary. The court must ask questions such as: Does the director have
any personal ties to the management and, particularly, to the
CEO? Does the director have any other suspect connections to the
corporation or to other directors? Do this professor's research
activities depend upon private donations? If the answer to any of
these questions is "yes," then the court must deem the director non-
independent. The result of this test is that a corporation can make
sizeable donations to a university at which one of its director works
as a professor without negatively affecting the alignment of
interests; the donations are not large enough for the university's
administration to exert pressure upon the professor to act contrary
to the shareholders' interests. Alternatively, if there is a single
suspect connection between the corporation and the donee, the
director will be considered tainted and set aside as non-independ-
ent.
Finally, the court must consider the impact of a massive lump-
sum donation that is either prospective in nature or is more than
five years in the past. For example, the court in Limited concluded
that a previous $25 million gift to The Ohio State University
created a sense of"owingness" in a director who formerly served as
the university's president.20 2 Similarly, the Oracle court made a
point to discuss the insurmountable pressure forcing any director
affiliated with Stanford University to please CEO Larry Ellison
when it was publicly known that he was going to contribute $150
million to either Stanford or one of a few other schools.2"3 As alluded
to by the courts in both of these cases, such large donations tend to
influence even the purest of hearts. Such amazing displays of
philanthropy cannot accompany professed independence and any
director associated with such largess should not be deemed
independent.
To be sure, this proposal may have dramatic side-effects of its
own. One might argue that charitable contributions would decrease,
201. For this facet of the test, the court should triple the figures used for suspect
individuals.
202. See In re Limited, Inc. Sholders Litig., No. CIV.A. 17148-NC, 2002 WL 537692, at *7
(Del. Ch. Mar. 27, 2002).
203. See In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 934 (Del. Ch. 2003).
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because personal connections between corporations, directors, and
charities foster more generous donations. However, the public
would not stand for such a decline in "philanthropic" generosity.
Whether it be the media uncovering such results or the former
benefactors complaining of reduced contributions without the quid
pro quos, corporations could not withstand open scrutiny on this
matter. The modern corporation considers its public appearance
paramount 2°4 and it would not allow such a furor to amass. Some
might also argue that this test almost completely drains the pool of
applicants qualified to become directors. This test does not disqual-
ify many individuals from serving on corporate boards, however, for
there are thousands of universities and nonprofit organizations
around the country with capable individuals willing to serve on
boards. The search for board members may become more difficult,
given that the corporation's management or inside directors cannot
woo their friends or acquaintances to join them in the boardroom,
but besides simply searching harder for independent directors, the
corporation could simply tap into its resources and hire an execu-
tive/director search firm to locate potential candidates. Addition-
ally, simply because a director is non-independent does not mean
that he cannot serve on the board.
CONCLUSION
Corporations are beginning to dominate American society.
Americans are investing in these publicly held companies run by
executives and monitored by directors. Recently, the world has
witnessed a frightening number of corporate scandals that have
resulted in tremendous losses for the average shareholder. To
compensate the injured shareholder, the law provides him with a
right to sue the directors on behalf of the corporation to recoup the
corporation's loss.
204. See Mark Tungate, The Quest for Superbrand Status: How Does A Business Brand
Build Itself Up To Become a Superbrand?, MARKETING, May 9, 2002, at 17 (noting how Shell
Oil Co.'s "enviable public image" is a key component to its "superbrand" status). Some
corporate leaders go to great lengths to foster a strong public image. See, e.g., Gary Weiss,
The $140,000,000 Man: What Dick Grasso's Excessive Payout Reveals About How He Runs
the New York Stock Exchange, BUS. WK., Sept. 15, 2003, at 84 (describing how former NYSE
chairman and Chief Executive Officer Dick Grasso "[r]aised the exchange's public image"
through various publicity stunts, including an appearance in HBO's hit series Sex and the
City).
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This right to sue is meaningless if the shareholder cannot have
his case tried on the merits. With the development of demand
futility and special litigation committees, the shareholder plaintiffs
must battle to prove that the given directors did not exercise
independent judgment, in order for a court to examine the transac-
tion more closely. To counter this attack, the corporations often
enlist the services of persons associated with nonprofit organiza-
tions who seem above reproach. Almost universally, the nonprofit
leader will receive not only a director's fee but also substantial
donations from the corporation to his respective organization. More
attention must be paid to whether and how much such donations
affect a director's ability to remain independent and not become
beholden to the corporation or one of its dominating insiders.
As more directors from nonprofit organizations are added to
corporate boards, courts cannot afford to be influenced by a direc-
tor's ostensibly unflawed character and they must use a comprehen-
sive, functional approach when defining a particular director's
independence. In sum, the courts must first pay more attention to
the problem and then implement a new test for director independ-
ence to account for this growing segment of corporate boards.
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APPENDIX
COMPANY
Wat-Mart Stores
General Motors
Exxon Mobil
Ford Motor
General Electric
Citigroup
ChevronTexaco
International Business Machines (IBM)
American International Group (AIG)
Verizon Communications
Altria Group
ConocoPhillips
Home Depot
Hewlett-Packard
Boeing
Fannie Mae
Merck
Kroger
Cardinal Health
McKesson
Sears Roebuck
Morgan Stanley
Conagra Foods
Lowe's
Wachovia Corp.
Electronic Data Systems
HCA
Abbott Laboratories
3M
American Electric Power
Gap
PG&E Corp.
Eastman Kodak
Cinergy
Pacificare Health Systems
Xcel Energy
Oracle
Pepsi Bottling
Principal Financial
Continental Airlines
Smurfit-Stone Container
Yum Brands
Putte Homes
SafeCo.
DTE Energy
Avon Products
Keyspan
Apple Computer
Federal-Mogul
Fortune 500 Total #
Rank Directors
1 14
2 10
3 12
4 14
5 17
6 17
7 14
8 11
9 19
10 12
11 12
12 16
13 12
14 11
15 11
16 17
17 11
18 17
19 14
20 8
30 11
40 11
50 13
60 10
70 15
80 10
90 13
100 13
110 11
120 13
130 11
140 9
150 12
160 9
170 11
180 12
190 10
200 10
210 14
220 14
230 8
240 12
250 11
260 10
270 13
280 11
290 10
300 6
310 8
Insiders or
Former Outsiders: CEOs, Target
Insiders Presidents, Attorneys Members
6 8 0
1 9 0
2 9 1
4 8 2
4 11 2
3 13 1
2 11 1
1 8 2
9 8 2
2 10 0
1 10 1
2 13 1
1 11 0
1 8 2
2 8 1
3 9 5
1 5 5
4 12 1
1 12 1
1 7 0
1 9 1
2 8 1
1 11 1
1 7 2
1 13 1
2 7 1
2 8 3
3 8 2
1 9 1
1 9 3
4 7 0
1 7 1
1 9 2
1 7 1
1 9 1
1 10 1
3 3 4
4 5 1
2 11 1
2 10 2
1 7 0
2 10 0
1 10 0
1 8 1
2 10 1
2 9 0
1 8 1
1 5 0
3 5 0
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COMPANY
Baker Hughes
Northeast Utilitities
State Street Corp.
Mellon Financial Corp.
Mohawk lndusties*
Black & Decker
Leggett & Plan
Hershey Foods
Cablevision Systems
Nash Finch
Regions Financial
Brunswick
Jabi Circoit*
American Axle & Manufacturing
Wesco International
PepsiAmericas
Smith International
Lennox International'
Neiman Marcus
Fortune S00
Rank
320
330
340
350
361
370
380
390
4O0
410
420
430
441
450
461
470
480
491
50
Total #
Directors
11
11
16
15
9
8
10
9
14
Insiders or
Former Insders
1
2
2
2
3
1
4
1
7
Outsiders: CEOs, Presidents,
Attorneys
8
7
12
9
6
6
6
7
6
7
10
10
5
Target
Members
2
2
2
4
0
1
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
3
*NOTE: Each marked company was added to complete a full list of the Fortune 500 companies. The company directly
preceeding the marked one either did not have information readily available, no longer exiats, or is not a public company.
RESULTS
median number of directors
median percent Insiders (currently holds an executive position or has in the past)
median percent outsiders (has no affiliation with the company, usually executives from other companies, attorneys, etc.)
median percent target members (university professors and presidents, foundation executives, etc.)
median number of target members
average number of directors
average percent of insiders
average percent of outsiders
average pecent of target members
average number of target members
***AI errors found herein are, of course, my own.
Benjamin E. Ladd*
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